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Idea generation is the essence of design as everyday problem solving. Generating 
ideas can be a matter of life and death or simply a distraction from our normal existence.  
The eureka moment also means that sometimes people improvise and repurpose whatever 
is at hand to solve their own problems. As a consequence, a chair becomes a bookshelf; a 
shoelace can be used to stop bleeding.  Generating alternative uses for common 
household objects should be facilitated by generating alternative situations in which 
improvisational design might be needed.  One way to encourage as many alternative 
ideas as possible is to think through heuristics of discovery.  A number of directions have 
emerged concerning what can be used as good design heuristics to trigger creative 
mindsets. Does "walking away from the problem" or "letting the mind wander" really 
help generate a greater number of alternative ideas?  How might shifting a perspective 
activate proper associative processing and enhance creative performance? Prior studies in 
generating novel uses often directed people to focus on objects, situations, and events, or 
to switch between a different time or space. One plausible method yet to be studied 
systematically, however, is for participants to think of different roles people can take in a 
society, such as chef, physician, mechanic, athlete, and so on.
	  
	  
This dissertation research sets out to uncover certain creative mindsets and 
potential design heuristics that promote alternative solutions to problems ordinary people 
encounter in daily life. The studies conducted for this dissertation particularly focus on 
two mindset conditions: the mind-wandering group was manipulated to "let things come 
to your mind" and the human-centric group was manipulated to "think of different roles," 
both conditions representing widespread beliefs among professional designers about 
generating ideas. In two online experiments, participants were asked to generate as many 
alternative uses of common household objects as they could using either the mind-
wandering or the human-centric mindsets triggered by different search heuristics.  Study 
1 had a control group and names of objects.  Study 2 presented pictures of objects to half 
the participants and names of objects to the other half. The dependent variables were the 
fluency of ideas, the originality of ideas, the diversity of assignable roles and the response 
time between ideas.   
Results in both studies support the effectiveness of thinking of different roles in 
the human-centric mindset condition in increasing the fluency of alternative uses and the 
originality of ideas. Participants given no particular search strategy frequently reported 
that they tended to have things come to their minds, but they didn’t differ from the mind-
wandering mindset group and were outperformed by those using the human-centric 
mindset strategy. Furthermore, seeing pictures didn’t necessarily give either mindset 
group the edge in generating more uses and more original ideas.  Presenting the names of 
objects and providing specific roles with the search heuristics seemed enough to help 
induce a diversity of roles and hence more alternative uses and more original ideas. 
	  
	  
Those who let their minds wander did take longer to generate ideas than those using the 
focused associations of roles. 
The general findings in the dissertation are consistent with previous research 
showing that those who generated more ideas were more likely to generate more original 
ideas and those who persisted in ideation more frequently produced more original uses.  
On the whole, this dissertation research provides significant evidence for the heuristics of 
roles as a powerful perspective shifter to enhance everyday design concepts for human 
scale.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Generating new ideas is an essential phenomenon in the progress of all human 
activity.  A person’s chances of survival and success in life often depend on the steady 
flow of new ideas from day to day.  Many influential thinkers, inventors, and designers 
have claimed to find their inspiration in odd places and at unusual times.  The 
mathematician and physicist Henri Poincaré recorded that while on one occasion a trip 
away from home interrupted his meticulous research, the relevant "idea came to me” as 
he prepared to board a bus during the journey (Poincaré, 1913/2014).  The 
omnicompetent designer Philippe Starck once developed an idea for a chair while waiting 
for an airplane to take off, claiming to have "captured the violence of the idea" as the seat 
belt signs came on (Lawson, 2005).  
Although some innovators have suggested intuition as the predominant element in 
the intrinsic nature of creative ideas, others have emphasized that they need several things 
to work on in order to not waste time while incubating them.  For John Wild, who 
invented ultrasound technology for body imaging, that meant testing a few possibilities as 
prototypes with reasonable expectations, which lead to ideas for new devices altogether 
(Weber & Perkins, 1992).  Alex Moulton, creator of the "minibike," believed that "it's 
important to have one or two dissimilar lines of thought to follow.  Not too many, but just 
so that you can rest one groove in the mind and work in another" (Lawson, 2005, p.150).  
Besides these noteworthy examples, though, anyone can come up with an idea that is new 
to themselves, like an aspiring designer who turns an old T-shirt and a clothing rack into 
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an exotic “wearable lamp,” or a fearless home cook who creates interesting recipes from 
leftovers.  
These and plenty of other similarly amusing anecdotes and retrospective accounts 
of creative fulfillment certainly provide us with a glimpse into the potentially relevant 
cognitive processes of idea generation, but we still cannot be sure how a diversity of 
factors flow together to resolve problems creatively and allow fascinating things to 
happen.  It appears that creatively solvable problems vary in their level of complexity and 
cover a multitude of conditions, from the greatest achievements of human genius 
throughout history to the very subjective experiences of private moments or the minor 
insights of ordinary people.  Although many problem situations seem quite different on 
the surface, they all share similar or simple parts concealed by different domains but that 
can be revealed through one’s own common knowledge.  Design problems often require 
more than just a feeling for materials, form or color.  Certainly all professional designers 
need a variety of highly trained perceptual skills, but it seems reasonable to suggest that 
ordinary people are capable of initiating “change in man-made things,” once regarded as 
the “ultimate definition” of design (Jones, 1970/1992).  It may not be too surprising to 
find out that some of the most important mundane objects of modern times were created 
by people from unrelated roles.  For example, “Kodak chrome film” by a musician; 
“parking meter” by a journalist; “ball-point-pen” by a sculptor (Glegg, 1969).  
The aim of this dissertation research, therefore, is to uncover certain creative 
mindsets and potential design heuristics, to promote alternative solutions to problems 
ordinary people encounter in a cycle of daily life that is repeated over and over again.  
People often improvise when there are no means to directly solve a problem, using 
	  
  3 
whatever is at hand.  As a consequence, a chair becomes a bookshelf, a shoelace can be 
used to stop bleeding, and a flashlight can double as a meat tenderizer or a rolling pin 
while camping.   Generating alternative uses for common household objects should be 
facilitated by generating alternative situations where improvisational design might be 
needed. 
Creative Mindsets of the Ordinary People 
Many questions arise from previous studies of creativity. Do ideas simply come to 
the minds of the creative people spontaneously? Do creative professionals have certain 
special cognitive abilities?  Do ordinary people generate creative ideas as well?  Can 
ordinary people learn anything from their everyday experiences in order to be creative? 
Over the past few decades, researchers have come to realize that the creative mindset 
does not only rely on personal traits or expertise but may also change depending on 
situation, context, and strategies (e.g. Runco & Albert, 2010; Sawyer, 2011).  
A working assumption for this dissertation research is that everyone can be a "somewhat 
creative" (Schank & Cleary, 1995) designer to get through their routines, and creative 
mindsets are not only reserved for eminent geniuses nor even only prolific professionals.  
“Somewhat creative” means a degree of originality.  Hundreds, thousands or even more 
people may already solve similar problems everyday, but as long as someone can 
generate variations, combinations, or just something novel and useful for the task at hand, 
it should suffice to meet the condition of creativity based on the statistical rarity specific 
to the individual or the larger social group (e.g. Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Runco & 
Jaeger, 2012; Runco, 2004).   
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How might creative mindsets best be triggered and developed?  That is, what 
specific kinds of settings (e.g. a messy desk, a high ceiling), conditions (e.g. incubation), 
types of stimuli (e.g. pictorial, textual examples), design heuristics or strategies (e.g. 
abstraction, decomposition), and so on, appear to promote idea generation?  These are not 
new issues (e.g. Perkins, 1981; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992) and, under the recent 
influence of the mind-wandering phenomenon (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) and the 
mainstreaming of mindfulness training (e.g. Baas, Nevicka, & Ten Velden, 2014) to 
enhance creative idea generation, they are once again receiving attention. 
Heuristics for Design Discoveries 
While searching for new ideas, going beyond the information given and relating it 
to knowledge structures (e.g. episodic and semantic memory) also provides people with 
the basis for the generation of new and uncommon inferences across different "problem 
spaces" (Newell & Simon, 1972; Perkins, 1992) they create. For example, if a person has 
to find unusual ways to use a chair, he or she has the old knowledge about the use of a 
typical chair but may combine it, transform it, or associate it with something else in order 
to come up with new uses.  Going beyond the concrete example of a chair and 
transforming it into a more abstract representation is one way, seeing the chair as an 
"object made from wood/steel with a flat surface," may help overcome the traditional 
idea. Another way is to think of particular roles, like that of a football player, a chef or 
even a thief, which may help generate new ideas from new associations between the 
object and those specific roles.  Both bottom-up and top-down hints and a variety of other 
cognitive strategies have been identified from Gilhooly's (2007) informative process 
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analysis of Alternate Uses Task.  The study showed that participants primarily relied on 
memory-based strategies for ideas generated earlier in the course of working on the task. 
Participants were also inclined to use different kinds of strategies for those ideas 
generated later, like imagining disassembling the object and recombining parts into 
different objects.  It was reported that the original ideas for uses were related particularly 
strongly to this disassembly strategy (Gilhooly, 2007).  Another earlier study of strategies 
using ad hoc categories (Vallee-Tourangeau, Anthony and Austin, 1998) also found that 
participants often started with an “experiential” strategy, “memories of specific or generic 
personal experiences involving interactions with the category instances acted as cues,” 
and later by a “semantic” strategy in which “abstract conceptual characteristics of a 
category were employed to retrieve category exemplars." 
People often face this dilemma in design discoveries every day: a "combinatorial 
explosion" of possibilities (Weber & Perkins, 1992) that comes from the blend of old 
knowledge, false memories, belief, conception, imagination, and the demand for new 
uses for and new visions of mundane objects and stereotypes.  A basic challenge to the 
agile and creative mindset lies in how to conduct an effective search and shift between 
different perspectives without becoming trapped in the counterproductive effect of 
fixation (e.g. Jansson & Smith, 1991).  One especially urgent question is: what makes 
people generate new ideas? More specifically, how might creative mindsets best be 
triggered and developed?  One way that has not been studied systematically is through 
informal heuristics of discovery, which can be efficient cognitive processes, conscious or 
unconscious, when people do not have enough information or expertise (Simon, 1990). It 
regards heuristics broadly as idea associations generating solutions through the common 
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real-world knowledge (Minsky, 2006) that adults equipped for their daily life. Heuristics 
do not guarantee success, but they can help drive idea generation faster than any 
mechanism based on sheer chance variation at one end, and faster than formal reasoning 
at the other end (Weber & Perkins, 1992).  Many powerful heuristics fill our everyday 
activities.  "Restart your computer if your computer becomes frozen," for example, or, 
"The early bird catches the worm,” which can even become reversed as “The early worm 
gets eaten,” a mentality often possessed by people in a passive culture.  In the realm of 
design ideation, a number of directions have emerged concerning what can be used as 
good design heuristics to trigger creative mindsets: Does "walking away from the 
problem" really help generate more ideas? Is it possible that adding a few words such as 
"be creative" or "think different" can be powerful enough to boost one’s ideation? How 
could shifting a perspective by “thinking of distant time,” “thinking of a faraway place,” 
or “thinking of different circumstances” activate proper associative processing and 
enhance creative performance?, etc.   
The prior studies in generating novel uses often directed people to focus on 
objects, situations or events themselves, or switch between a different time or space (e.g. 
Förster & Liberman, 2004; Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009), but one plausible way yet to be studied 
systematically is to think of different roles people can take on in a society, such as chef, 
gardener, physician, mechanic, athlete, and so on.  The operational definition for the roles 
in this dissertation study is the roles that everyone can play and don’t necessarily have to 
be aligned with professions.  There are many amateur athletes, cooks, photographers, 
musicians, and so on. The meanings of roles are changing as well.  The role of a writer is 
a good example. A writer (or a scribe) was used to be a person who was able to make 
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marks on papyrus so others could read in ancient times.  As the skill of writing became 
more widespread and the tool of writing became more accessible, the role of a writer 
became that of someone who could tell interesting stories in a specified way.  Nowadays, 
because of the evolution of digital technology, it seems that anyone who uses social 
media and records their opinions routinely can call himself or herself a blogger, a modern 
derivative of writer. In a sense, roles are the activities they define.  The assumption is that 
participants can be acting as both designers and users for this kind of conceptual idea 
generation task.  
Idea Generation Tasks for Everyday Design 
Many design issues such as incubation and fixation have been investigated 
through various types of problems developed by psychologists for a controlled 
environment. Typical laboratory studies rely on participants’ responses to a variety of 
tasks in a relatively short period of time and are often challenged about their findings’ 
relevance to the real world. A laboratory study, however, can be more effective in 
verifying and connecting the relationships between processes and outcomes than many 
other methods like the so-called in vivo method (e.g. Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001), for 
example, which can be adapted to collect enormous amounts of data from those real-
world events (e.g. weekly lab meetings, design brain storming sessions, and so on) using 
video, audio recordings, or transcription to examine the analogy in various domains of 
science and engineering design.  
These problems in laboratory investigations can be either well-defined (e.g. a 
multiplication problem) or ill-structured, such as insight problems (e.g. Duncker, 1945; 
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Metcalfe, & Wiebe, 1987), which only allow a single solution, and divergent problems 
like the Alternate Uses Task (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1978) which 
encourages as many novel and useful ideas about a common household object as its 
respondents can generate.  Remote Association Task (Mednick, 1962) is another 
paradigm to analyze the creative process of generating unusual associations. This task 
presents a series of three seemingly unrelated words (e.g. rat-blue-cottage), and 
participants must produce a specific fourth word that conceptually unites all of three 
words (i.e. cheese).  Design problems are a kind of creative problem solving (e.g. Newell 
& Simon, 1972) that can be analyzed through various exploratory experiments in 
laboratory settings as well. Everyday design problems are often ill-structured and do not 
have a single solution. One common experiment paradigm to study professional or novice 
designers relies on exposure to three different conditions of stimuli: visual, textual, or a 
combination of the two conditions, all with examples of solutions (e.g. Jansson & Smith, 
1991; Casakin & Goldschmidt, 2000; Goldschmidt & Sever, 2011). 
This dissertation research adopts a paradigm of Novel Uses Task similar to 
Guilford's Alternate Uses Task (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1978), 
which encourages as many novel and useful ideas about a common household object as 
its respondents can generate.  Many previous studies often use one or two objects (e.g. a 
brick or knife are among the most commonly chosen) showed inconsistent results.  For 
example, a recent experiment (Nubaum & Silvia, 2011) based on Gilhooly’s protocol 
analysis (2007) found that using the “disassembly strategy” with a brick and a knife for 
the Alternate Uses Task seemed to further fixate certain people rather than promote more 
novel ideas. Both are objects with only one or two salient parts and which cannot be 
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really deconstructed unless a person goes beyond the existing forms to think about 
reducing the objects into small particles, like crushing the brick or melting the knife. 
Participants might find it difficult to implement the perceptual strategy (i.e. decomposing 
objects) without acquiring proper visual-spatial skills (Suwa & Tversky, 2001). 
Gilhooly’s original study (2007) used a larger range of objects, some of which could be 
deconstructed, but it is not clear whether people who came up with more creative uses for 
common objects can do so because they rely on the right kind of heuristics, and whether 
they tried to focus on the physical properties of those objects with the bottom-up hints or 
accessed other top-down common knowledge (e.g. settings, roles).  
The goal of the present research is to use better heuristics to trigger a larger 
quantity of ideas in order to extract a few more promising good ideas. It is necessary to 
ask people to generate as many alternative uses as they can for familiar household objects 
under various conditions.  Various types of information, such as specific category 
exemplars, general conceptual knowledge, stereotypes, fantasies, false memories, and so 
on, could be captured during the process of idea generation task as “candidate ideas” 
(Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992).  Although they are not finished products or final solutions 
to the problem at hand, they could represent starting points that either lead to the better 
idea or hinder the next step in the real world.  It is reasonable to assume that participants 
are “experts” in dealing with common, everyday objects with their real world knowledge 
despite the fact that they may be laypeople when it comes to design skills.  Instead of 
three objects shown at the same time, as specified in Guilford’s original Alternate Uses 
Task, participants in the present research will be presented with one object -- much like 
an open-ended prompt in a design session -- but only one object at a time for 5 minutes, 
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which should be an acceptable time to avoid exhaustion and distraction and still produce 
enough good ideas for the Internet task according to what was found from the pilot study.  
Participants will be repeating the same idea generation process for six to nine different 
objects.  
Research Questions 
If general heuristics can serve as cognitive solving strategies in the real world and 
in our minds, how do they help us trigger the creative mindsets to increase ideation and 
repurpose those designed objects to solve our own problems?  Can they be directed and 
systematized in the service of solutions?  There is some evidence indicating that goal-
oriented mindsets are more helpful in solving problems than those that are not; that 
sometimes “concrete stimuli” are more useful than “abstract stimuli”; and other times that 
“conceptual strategies” might help generate more novel ideas than “perceptual 
strategies.” This dissertation regards heuristics broadly as idea associations and indicators 
of creative performance, and seeks to identify the kinds of strategies that have been 
successful and those that have not.  Do people who come up with more original uses for 
common objects find a right kind of heuristics to shift perspectives?  Are some strategies 
better than others? Do pictorial stimuli of common objects facilitate or hinder original 
idea generation?  How and when does a right kind of heuristics enhance everyday design 
behavior and facilitate original design idea generation? 
The following literature review will address these issues through the evidence of 
everyday design behavior demonstrated in the mirror of laboratory studies and identify 
what can be used as good design heuristics to help trigger certain mindsets that give rise 
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to creative idea generation. A number of directions have emerged concerning the quest 
for generating creative ideas. The four general approaches considered in this paper are: 1) 
Take a Break: Immediate vs. Delayed Incubation; 2) “Be Creative!”: Implicit Cues and 
Explicit Instructions;  3) Shift Perspectives: Think of Different Times / Spaces / Roles / 
Events / Likelihoods; 4) Expand Examples: What you see may not be exactly what you 
get. 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE AND LABORATORY STUDIES 
Take a Break: Immediate vs. Delayed Incubation 
One approach has asserted that preconscious, implicit or unintentional associative 
processes could be linked to enhanced creative performance through the benefits of 
incubation. For decades laboratory studies have been trying to “capture” the elusive 
moment when a person sets a problem aside after a period of work, known as the 
incubation period (Wallas, 1926), during the creative process. The experimental 
paradigms (i.e. delayed incubation) of these incubation studies are more or less identical.  
Participants in an incubation condition usually start with the target task for a fixed time 
and then switch to an interpolated activity for another fixed time (incubation period) and 
finally return to the target task for a further fixed time.  The performance of participants 
in the incubation condition is compared to the control group which has worked 
continuously on the target task without break.  A recent meta-analysis results (Sio & 
Ormerod, 2009) from 117 studies using this classic paradigm showed that people do 
benefit from an incubation period when they were attempting to solve creative problems, 
particularly those divergent tasks. Another qualitative review of experiments on 
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incubation (Dodds, Ward, & Smith, 2003) found that 29 out of 39 experiments had a 
significant effect of incubation. One substantial demonstration of this is that the 
suggestion of hints affects creative performance. Presenting a hint during the incubation 
period can either have positive (if the hint is useful) or negative effects (if the hint is 
misleading).         
There is no doubt that putting a problem aside is often helpful, but it appears there 
are many competing theories behind the effects of incubation (Gilhooly, Georgiou, 
Garrison, Reston, & Sirota, 2012).  For example, "Intermittent conscious work" suggests 
that people may perform intermittent conscious work even during the supposed 
incubation period (e.g. Weisberg, 2006, pp. 443). "Fresh look" or "Forgetting fixation" 
proposes that people often approach a problem with incorrect hints or misleading 
heuristics and become fixated. The previous research findings imply that people can 
benefit from the incubation effect only after they have been misdirected, but they may not 
become fixated on their own.  The fixation effects (e.g. Luchins, 1951) can be relieved 
through forgetting (Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Smith, 1995) during the incubation 
period. "Unconscious thought" is another popular account that seems to be often referred 
in the context of Poincaré's way of getting new ideas (Poincaré, 1913/2014). This 
approach suggests that incubation effects occur through active but unconscious 
processing (Campbell, 1960; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006; Gilhooly et al. 2012, 2013) as activation spreading in an associative network (e.g. 
"hospital" activates "doctor", which activates "nurse", "medicine", etc.).  
Is it better to set the creative generation task aside immediately and return to it 
later to get the beneficial effects of incubation? Or is it better start the initial attempt at 
	  
  13 
the creative generation task right away until getting stuck and then set it aside before 
undertaking it again?  Gilhooly (2012, 2013) demonstrated that subjects in immediate 
incubation (in which the incubation period of interpolated activity takes place 
immediately after the target generation task instructions have been given) performed 
better than the delayed incubation (as demonstrated in the classic paradigm).  In a recent 
study, Gilhooly et al. (2012) adapted the paradigm, initially developed by Dijksterhuis 
and Meurs (2006), in order to clarify whether immediate-incubation is helpful in 
generating new ideas (e.g. Alternate Uses Task) with a 2 (incubation position: immediate 
vs. delayed.) × 3 (interpolated task: none vs. verbal vs. spatial) between-group factorial 
design. The target task was to generate unusual uses for a brick.  The interpolated 
activities during the incubation period were either verbal (anagrams) or spatial (mental 
rotation tasks).  In the immediate-incubation conditions, participants were first instructed 
about a target generating task (unusual uses for a brick) and immediately were asked to 
work on an interpolated task (anagrams or mental rotation) instead for 4 minutes (i.e. 
incubation period), after which they would return to the target generation task for 7 
minutes without a break. Participants in control groups worked on the unusual uses task 
for 7 minutes without any incubation periods and worked on either mental rotations or 
anagrams for 4 minutes. Participants in the immediate-incubation group performed better 
than the control group.  It appears that by using the immediate incubation, the mechanism 
of beneficial forgetting theory may be ruled out as there is no period work in which 
fixations-effect could be developed. Such a process could still be incorporated, however, 
in the classic delayed incubation paradigm.   
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Furthermore, in a separate study, Gilhooly et al. (2013) investigated interactions 
between the target task (Guilford’s Alternate Uses Task or Mental Synthesis Task, 
adapted from Finke & Slayton, 1988) and interpolated task (63 five-letter anagrams or 24 
mental rotations in a between-subjects design with six different groups.  Participants 
worked on the target tasks for 5 minutes in each of four experimental conditions, then 
they worked on the interpolated tasks (i.e. anagrams or mental rotations) for 5 minutes, 
before returning to the target task for a final 5 minutes.  The two control groups provided 
baseline data for target tasks without incubation breaks for 10 minutes.  They found 
significant incubation effects overall.  Specifically, there were interactions in the “spatial 
incubation” with mental rotations task enhanced fluency of new uses and rated creativity, 
while the “verbal incubation” together with the anagrams task enhanced fluency of spatial 
task and rated creativity for the sketch but not vice versa.  These findings confirmed that 
people generated more new ideas and performed better in a mental synthesis task when 
working on two different kinds of tasks (dissimilar activities between an interpolated task 
and the target task) as compared to those who worked on similar kinds of tasks (an 
interpolated activity similar to the target task).   
Another example of the incubation period is mind-wandering, or self-generated 
thought, which has been said to capture the common phenomenon of our minds drifting 
away from a target task toward unrelated, internal thoughts and fantasies (Smallwood, & 
Schooler, 2006). A number of studies have popularized this research topic. One recent 
study (Baird et al., 2012) investigated whether engaging in mind-wandering (i.e. through 
a low-working memory demand task) would enhance idea generation in the Alternate 
Uses Task.  They compared this mind-wandering condition with three other conditions: 
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the demanding task with top-down attention; the rest period (sitting quietly during the 
incubation period); and no break (without receiving a break). To measure creative 
performance, participants in all conditions were asked to generate as many unusual uses 
as possible for a common object (the paper of Baird et al. did not specify what specific 
objects were used in the experiment).  First, participants would be presented with two 
objects (2 minutes per object) to measure baseline creative performance.  Then 
participants were assigned to one of the four between-groups conditions to manipulate the 
incubation period and then returned to the Alternate Uses Task again (four objects were 
presented randomly: two familiar objects, which had been presented at baseline and two 
new objects).  It appears that participants who were engaged in an undemanding task in 
the incubation period performed better in generating unusual uses than those who were in 
the demanding task, rest, and no break conditions.  However, it is interesting to note that 
participants only generated more new uses when they were exposed to the same object, 
which demonstrated that the improvement was due to an incubation process rather than a 
general increase in creative solving.  According to Baird et al., (2012), one plausible 
explanation about why mind-wandering may facilitate idea generation is consistent with 
the "unconscious thought" account of incubation (e.g. Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006; 
Gilhooly et al., 2012).  This set of empirical studies raised the question of when "focused 
deliberation" or "distraction" can best help generate new ideas.              
"Be Creative!" Implicit Cues and Explicit Instructions 
Another approach has proposed that ideas are chained together; they can arise 
spontaneously in mind through a series of associative processes in semantic memory 
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(Mednick, 1962; Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005).  As Poincaré 
(1913/2014) noted, "to create consists of making new combinations of associative 
elements which are useful..." and suggested that the most fertile ideas would be ones 
"formed of elements drawn from domains which are far apart."  Along with this notion, 
the associative theory (Mednick, 1962) suggested that people with steep associative 
hierarchies will produce high-frequency associations at the beginning of word association 
tasks (e.g. table-chair) and become stagnant while people with flat associative hierarchies 
will produce a stream of remotely associated concepts. The Remote Associates Task 
(RAT) was developed under the Mednick's hypotheses and was often used to assess 
insight problem solving when the "a-ha!" moment suddenly appears. A recent 
neuroimaging study (Bowden et al., 2005) has shown that brain activation prior to 
problem solution, and even prior to problem presentation, may predict RAT response by 
insight.  One aspect of associative processes is that they do not seem to perform well 
under conscious guidance and that unconscious thought would be needed in order to 
stimulate the associative search for creative ideas as discussed in the incubation studies 
above. 
On the other hand, unconscious thought cannot really create new knowledge and 
conscious learning and processing are needed to establish a foundation of knowledge.  
Perhaps combining conscious and unconscious thought would help make discoveries 
effectively. 
A rich set of research in social psychology has shown that motivations, mindsets, 
goals, and other aspects of thought and behavior can be primed out of people’s awareness 
in everyday life.  The notion of automatic behavior activation has been found in one of 
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the most influential experiments concerning the priming method by Bargh, Chen, and 
Burrows (1996; experiment 2).  They demonstrated that participants primed with 
concepts related to the elderly stereotype (e.g., "Florida," "old," or "lonely") walked more 
slowly down a hallway compared to those primed with control words (e.g., "thirsty," 
"clean," or "private"). It appears that priming a trait, a stereotype, or a behavior would 
result in an increased probability that people would perform the primed behavior (Förster, 
Liberman, & Friedman, 2007). As a consequence, performance can be changed on 
memory tests, creativity tests, and flexibility tests.  For example, priming "professor" 
relative to "soccer hooligan" leads to more correct responses to general knowledge 
questions (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998). "Professor" and "hooligan" have 
distinctive traits associated with their social perception. Could mere exposure to creative 
others guide ordinary people to enhance their generative power?  What about social 
groups like "punks" or "engineers" that are usually perceived to be creative but evaluated 
in different circles and in different ways?    
One recent research (Förster, Friedman, Butterbach, & Sassenberg, 2005) 
investigated the possible associative link between deviancy and creativity. In Experiment 
2, participants who were asked to think about a “punk” solved more creative insight 
problems and those who were asked to think about an “engineer” solved more analytical 
reasoning problems. Participants were randomly assigned to either the punk condition 
(deviancy cue) or the engineer (non-deviancy cue) condition. They were primed through 
thinking and writing down in detail what they imagined about being another person 
(either a punk or an engineer) and then were asked to complete three insight problems (2 
minutes for each problem) and four analytical GRE reasoning problems translated into 
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German (4 minutes in total). The goal of “Creative insight scores” was to compare the 
total number of correct solutions (out of three).  Participants in the punk condition 
performed significantly better compared to those in the engineer condition. As for the 
analytical thinking scores, the result was to compare the total number of correct solutions 
of the GRE questions (out of four). On the other hand, participants in the engineer 
condition solved significantly more GRE logic problems than those in the punk 
condition.  It is interesting to note that a difference existed from the experiment 
mentioned earlier concerning the semantic priming of the "professor" (Dijksterhuis & 
Van Knippenberg, 1998) linked to general motivation.  It appears that the prime in this 
experiment triggered different kinds of processing style as the same punk priming 
enhanced insight problem solving but impeded performance on the GRE analytical tasks.  
However, the researchers reported that they could not rule out possible demand effects 
(i.e. a more explicit priming technique of asking participants to write down the details of 
the role).  
One exciting question is raised when the potential evidence shows the mere 
perception of a person or a social group could trigger our creative mindset to perform 
accordingly. If people are made to think about someone like Darwin or Michelangelo, 
would it possibly have an additive effect and enhance the performance of generating 
ideas to prime with highly intelligent or creative exemplars other than the stereotypes of 
intellectual or creative groups of people (i.e. scientists or designers)?  It has turned out 
that priming exemplars has caused contrasting rather than assimilative effects 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 1998).  Dijksterhuis and colleagues (1998) demonstrated a contrast 
effect with the same priming paradigm used by the stereotype study of the elderly people 
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(Bargh et al, 1996). A group of Dutch participants who were primed with a specific 
exemplar (Juliana, Queen of the Netherlands, who was 89-years-old when the experiment 
took place) reportedly walked faster than those who were primed with the stereotype of 
elderly people.  Another experiment in the same article also showed that thinking about 
Einstein may interfere a person’s intellectual performance.  Dijksterhuis and his 
colleagues (1998) argued that priming an exemplar (e.g. Einstein) may activate 
stereotypes (e.g. professor), and also activate traits (e.g. highly intelligent), but at the 
same time may also evoke an appreciation of the particular person.   
This empirical research highlights the fact that priming stereotypes or traits is 
very different from priming exemplars. Particularly, exposure to specific exemplars will 
increase the probability of engaging in a spontaneous comparison when the object of 
comparison is "recently encountered," "explicitly judged," and "extreme" according to the 
previous research (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995) underlined by Dijksterhuis et al. 
(1998). Therefore, if people were primed with a specific creative exemplar like 
Michelangelo rather than a creative prototyped group (e.g. architect), a person might 
become cautious and think "I'm not a person like that” (e.g. “How could I create a great 
artwork like the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel?”) and hence their performance is very 
likely to be hindered rather than improved in creative thinking. 
If thinking about certain people can enhance or impede creative thinking, could 
similar kinds of conceptual priming phenomena result from exposure to objects 
associated with "creativity"?  A group of researchers have argued that "to be creative" is a 
type of goal-based processing (Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 2008).  The study 
showed that goals can even be activated by the perception of objects (i.e. the Apple or 
	  
  20 
IBM logo) that are associated with goals. Apple's brand is often associated with 
innovation and creativity while IBM is considered "traditional, smart and responsible" 
(Fitzsimons, et al., 2008).  For instance, participants who were exposed to an Apple logo 
by accident generated more ideas and more creative ideas about the unusual uses of 
"brick" than those who were exposed to an IBM logo. However, this study has been 
singled out for criticism about the reliability of typical divergent thinking as the measure 
of creativity (e.g. Alternate Uses Task) through a simple manipulation (Sawyer, 2011).   
It remains to be clarified whether "to be creative" as a semantic or goal priming 
effect can be evoked outside of awareness.  Other classic creativity studies (Wilson, 
Guilford, & Christensen, 1953; Christensen, Guilford, & Wilson, 1957) have found that 
explicitly asking people to "be creative" or "be clever" before working on the generation 
task can improve creative production.  This “be creative” effect has a different name in 
various experimental settings; sometimes it is called an “explicit instruction” or 
“instructional enhancement” effect (Chen et al., 2005; Runco & Okuda, 1991).  Some 
studies (e.g. Shalley, 1991) related motivation considered that "to be creative" is a special 
example of goal setting which can be operated in a similar manner as a productivity goal 
to connect with a person’s creative behavior.   
Harrington's study (1975) first raised the issue that failing to instruct people “to be 
creative” explicitly would have affected how people generate creative ideas.  In his study, 
the instructions of "be creative" and "be fluent" was manipulated between groups.   He 
suggested that participants have to know what they are being evaluated on, for example, 
whether they have to be creative or productive.  Katz and Poag (1979) followed 
Harrington's study (which tested only male participants) and had both female and male 
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participants randomly assigned to the conditions of standard instruction and “be creative” 
instruction.  The study found that both female and male participants increased ideas in the 
condition of “be creative” instruction.  However, female participants in the “be creative” 
condition generated many fewer alternative uses compared to the male participants in the 
same condition while female participants were able to generate more ideas in the standard 
condition compared to the male participants in that condition.  Katz and Poag (1979) 
proposed an interesting and plausible idea about the possibility that instructions can break 
habitual strategies.  They suggested that in ambiguous situations, like what often occur in 
standard instructions, participants would usually respond with habitual strategies. Female 
participants tended to use verbal skills while male participants tended to rely on 
nonverbal skills cited from previous research (Kogan, 1972). Because the "be creative" 
instructions disambiguated the situation, male participants were able to break from their 
habitual nonverbal strategies which might impede the generation of new ideas. At the 
same time, female participants who tended to use the habitual verbal strategies that could 
be useful for generating more ideas, and that should give them an advantage in the 
standard instructions, actually benefitted less from the "be creative" instructions.  
Regardless of gender differences in choosing the heuristics, could a similar situation be 
observed between the experts and the novices in generating ideas?  
It seems that people can deliberately be more creative, but not everyone can 
benefit from the simple goal-oriented strategy. A recent study (Niu & Liu, 2009) 
concerning the issue of cultural differences suggested that a mere motivation-induced 
prompt to be creative is not enough to facilitate student creativity. They argued that 
adding more detailed instruction on how to be creative would enhance creative thinking 
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because Chinese students are more accustomed to receiving direct instructions from their 
teachers. Chinese students were asked to complete two different kinds of creative 
generation tasks (collage design and story completion) and were randomly assigned to 
three conditions: control (standard instruction); creative-focus (students were told to be 
creative in addition to the standard instruction); and detailed instruction, which was 
described the same as in the creative-focus condition but with one additional sentence. In 
the collage design task, the instruction was given as follows: "To be creative, you could 
fold or tear the stickers when necessary so that the shapes and sizes of the materials 
would not limit your creative expression." In the story completion task, the instruction 
was given as follows: "To be creative, you could add or take away some characters and 
scenes when necessary so that characters and scenes of the story would not limit your 
creative expression."  The results showed that participants in the detailed instruction 
groups performed better than those in creative focus groups. The "to be creative" 
instruction turned out to interfere with the creative performance of collage-making rather 
than act as helpful motivation, according to the rating given by four Chinese graduate 
students, and it also contradicted evidence from other previous "to be creative" studies 
(e.g. Chen et al, 2005; Runco, Illies, & Eisenman, 2005). (The authors acknowledged that 
asking Chinese graduate students in social sciences as raters for the sake of convenience 
might be one flaw of this experimental design.) 
However, this study suggested that merely "to be creative" is not enough to 
enhance creative performance and both female and male students needed more elaborate 
“procedural” instruction.  There might be other complex factors involved, including the 
type of tasks and the rating methods across different cultures, but the mixed findings of 
	  
  23 
"to be creative" effects implicate a range of abilities to generate ideas and strategic skills.  
How do we know whether people need to be only directed or explicitly taught how to be 
creative?  One research proposed that "to be creative" explicitly did not "influence 
people's ability to generate ideas, but rather manipulated the choice of specific ideational 
strategies" (Runco & Okuda, 1991). Perhaps the level of explicitness can be varied in 
terms of the type of content, such as procedural instructions, conceptual instructions, and 
perceptual instructions (Runco, et al, 2005).   
Shift Perspectives: Think of Different Times / Spaces / Roles / Events / Likelihood 
Thinking creatively may acquire considerable latitude that benefits from the 
cognitive process of abstracting a set of central members of a category into our 
memories.  It is interesting to note that Piaget appears to have pioneered the proposal that 
abstraction can be a solution to getting new ideas from old knowledge, which he derived 
from his persistent observations of children’s mental activities.  His work on genetic 
epistemology (1968) suggested that there are two levels of abstraction: empirical 
abstraction (abstraction empirique) and reflective abstraction (abstraction 
réfléchissante). Empirical abstraction focuses on objects while reflective abstraction 
focuses on mental concepts and actions.  Piaget & Inhelder (1969/2000) gave a vivid 
example to demonstrate how a child acquires the notion of weight. A child may initially 
report the concrete experience of what objects are difficult or easy to lift, then the notion 
of weight starts to emerge from numerous physical experiences of heavy and light things. 
A different and separate notion about weight may also gradually be formed from repeated 
and sometimes confusing experiences; some large objects can be lighter than they look, 
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for instance, and some small ones can be very heavy. Consequently, a new concept of 
weight for the child is formed through the gradual discovery of structure, regularity, and 
pattern or coherence of information in the mental process of abstraction. The different 
levels of abstraction inferred by Piaget (1968) to indicate how children's minds might 
transpose from one level to another appear to be similar to mental construal processes 
that adults use to travel across different psychological distances (Trope & Liberman, 
2010).    
The different levels of abstraction indicate that abstraction is a continuum. 
Abstraction at the lower level means that people think about specific, detailed and 
imaginable things; abstraction at the higher level means that people think about less 
specific, ambiguous and unusual things. For example, a "wooden chair" is a predictable 
concept generated from lower abstract and higher concrete mindsets whereas a "happy 
chair" is an unanticipated concept generated from higher abstract and lower concrete 
mindsets.  An array of studies have shown that creative performance and judgment are 
affected when people think of distal events which cannot be directly experienced but only 
construed. Memories of the past, plans for the future, representations of faraway places or 
social interactions, and counterfactual thoughts are all mental construals.  (e.g. Förster, 
Friedman, & Liberman,2004; Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009; Liberman, Polack, Hameiri, & 
Blumenfeld, 2012; Mueller, Wakslak, & Krishnan, 2014; Kray, Galinsky, & Wong, 
2006). 
In terms of the laboratory paradigm, various methods of abstraction manipulation 
that have emerged in different areas of psychology can be adapted or integrated to induce 
more abstract or more concrete mindsets to examine creative design behaviors. One study 
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using perceptual stimuli (Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003) demonstrated that 
priming a perceptual procedure may affect conceptual performance. A map task asked 
participants in the global processing condition (i.e. more abstract) to focus on the map as 
a whole while participants in the local processing condition (i.e. more concrete) were 
asked to focus on the details of the map. In an apparently unrelated task, participants 
were then asked to generate alternative uses for a brick.  Participants who were primed 
with a broad focus produced more creative ideas than those who were primed with a 
narrow focus. Their better performance might be interpreted as the result of the expanded 
focus of perceptual attention, a procedure that can be carried over to the semantic 
network and therefore enhance idea generation from a broad conceptual scope (Isen & 
Daubman, 1984). 
Another popular paradigm to trigger the abstract mindset or to shift perspectives 
is that of why-versus-how tasks, initially developed by Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger 
(1985) by asking participants to think about a past event (e.g., eating breakfast) and 
describe why (more abstract) or how (more concrete) it occurred.  Vallacher and Wegner 
(1989)'s levels of personal agency questionnaire, which was originally designed to assess 
stable individual difference, argues along the same lines that actions can be identified in 
terms of the levels of abstraction of goal construal.  For example, "designing a house"  
can be identified as "sketching a floor plan" or "fulfilling my dream." "Sketching a plan" 
could be one of many concrete steps related to how to build a house while "fulfilling my 
dream" is a more abstract, high level identity answer to why one wants to design a house.  
Förster, Friedman, & Liberman (2004, Study 4) adapted this type of manipulation to 
frame a creative generation task.  German participants were asked to either think of 
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creative reasons why people should greet someone (abstract generation condition) or 
think of creative ways to greet someone (concrete generation condition).  To strengthen 
the manipulation of temporal perspective, participants were also asked to begin each 
listed response with the phrase "a year from now [tomorrow], I will greet someone 
because [by]________."  Participants had 2 minutes to generate solutions. The results on 
the rated creativity scores showed that participants in the distant future time perspective 
condition that completed the abstract generation (why) task were more creative than those 
in all other conditions. As for the fluency of solutions, more solutions were produced for 
the concrete level than for the abstract level.   
Förster et al. (2004, Study 5) went on to do a conceptual replication using a 
different abstraction manipulation.  German undergraduates and high school students 
were recruited and asked to "travel in time" for 2 minutes. Those who were in the distant 
future group imagined their lives in general 1 year from now while those in the near 
future group thought about tomorrow and the control group received no time travel 
instructions. After a general mood questionnaire, an apparently separate creative task was 
presented. Participants in the concrete condition were asked to find as many creative 
ideas to help "Ms. Miller water her plants" and participants in the abstract condition to 
help "Ms. Miller improve her room."  As in Study 4, the rated creativity score showed 
that participants in the distant time perspective group with the abstract task (design a 
room) performed better than those with the concrete task (watering plants).  This study 
confirmed that the distant time perspective played an important role and strengthened the 
assumption that an unintentional processing shift took place.   
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Since the priming of temporal distance showed some evidence to enhance  
creative thinking, more research has been extended to spatial distance (e.g. Jia et al., 
2009; Liberman et al., 2012).  Notably, a recent study (Liberman et al., 2012) developed 
a novel procedure to prime children's psychological distance based conceptually on the 
book Zoom (Banyai, 1998).  Participants in the distal condition would see a series of 
photographs that started with a close up view of a child's pencil on a desk and then 
gradually zoom out to further-away perspectives: the desk, the classroom, the school, and 
so on, all the way to a picture of the Milky Way. Those in the proximal condition would 
see the photographs in reverse order, with the galaxy first and the close-up view of the 
pencil last. The priming procedure took 5 minutes and then participants worked on a 
short version of the Tel Aviv Creativity Test (e.g. “What are all the things you can do 
with a shoe?" "What are all the things this shape could be?") for 15 minutes.  The finding 
confirmed the researchers' assumption that "distal places afford less direct experience 
and, hence, promote the use of more abstract mental constructs." 
These various ways to manipulate people's mindsets or shift their perspectives are 
a kind of procedural priming that is free of semantic content. It means that priming the 
procedural of "opening up one's attentional span" does not enhance the processing of 
contents but instead directs attention to peripheral information (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, 
& Steller, 1990). How does procedural priming facilitate creative performance?  One 
plausible explanation has been offered by "processing shift theory" (Schooler, Fiore, 
Brandimonte, 1997; Schooler, 2002), in which the phenomenon of "processing shift" is 
defined as an event in which cognitive procedures activated in the course of engaging in 
one task remain active and are carried over, or "transferred," to subsequent tasks. For 
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example, the study by Förster et al.(2004), proposed that the distant future temporal 
perspective elicits a "processing shift."  The researchers reported that "transfer-
appropriate" processing shifts result when the activated procedures are beneficial for 
subsequent processing. On the other hand, "transfer-inappropriate" processing shifts may 
occur when the procedures impede subsequent processing.  In other words, the general 
heuristics to "shift your perspectives," like between distant and near future time; faraway 
and nearby places; prototypes and exemplars, and so on, work in a similar way to the "be 
creative!" of semantic priming via spreading activation.  The difference is that procedures 
rather than semantic constructs are activated (Smith & Branscombe, 1987) during the 
initial processing of knowledge. 
Along the similar line of shifting perspectives, it is noteworthy that another 
prolific group of studies has focused on counterfactual mindsets that promote the ability 
to imagine alternative ideas, and hence influence subsequent creative performance (e.g. 
Kray, Galinsky, & Wong, 2006; Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007). The 
structure of counterfactual mindsets may be detected in the scenario in which participants 
take either an additive or subtractive form of an antecedent (Roese, 1994).  Additive 
counterfactual structures mean people add new antecedent elements to reconstruct reality 
(e.g., "If only I owned an umbrella, I would not have gotten wet"), whereas subtractive 
counterfactual structures mean people remove antecedents to reconstruct reality (e.g. "If 
only it hadn't rained today, I would not have gotten wet"). The previous research 
suggested that additive counterfactual mindsets might better serve a "preparative 
function" for future improvement than would subtractive counterfactual mindsets (Roese, 
1994). In a recent study, Kray et al. (2006) manipulated various types of counterfactual 
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mindsets to explore what they termed a "relational processing" style, which is 
characterized by "a tendency to ponder associations and make connections between a set 
of stimuli." In Study 5, participants were primed with counterfactual scenarios and then 
observed their subsequent performance on the Remote Association Task (Mednick, 1962) 
and the creative generation task (Rubin, Stoltzfus, and Wall, 1991) to create new labels 
for new products (at least one and up to three labels for pasta, a nuclear element, and a 
pain reliever) in a within-subject design. This study demonstrated that the activation of 
counterfactual mindsets and the exposure to the existing knowledge (known associations) 
led to better performance on the Remote Association Task but impaired the idea 
generation.   
The limitations presented in this study provided some evidence that a specific 
creative generation task (such as generating a name for a new product) might be 
constrained by the suffixes of the examples after counterfactual primes (e.g. all of the 
examples provided of nuclear elements ended in “-on” or “-ium” (e.g., radon, plutonium, 
etc.). Other fixation effects should be untangled and discussed separately.  The 
discrepancy between the results of Remote Association Task and the idea generation task 
in this study again raises the question of whether different aspects of creative thinking 
can be extracted in the process of idea generation.  In another study (Markman et al., 
2007, Study 4) to clarify whether such a counterfactual mindset can be detrimental or 
helpful to creative generation, researchers found no evidence of interference. 
Specifically, they found no evidence that additive counterfactual mindsets enhanced the 
generation of alternative uses for a brick (1 minute), and found that subtractive 
counterfactual mindsets performed no differently than the control group.   Overall, these 
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studies are consistent with the relevant mindset studies mentioned earlier that derived 
from Construal-Level Theory. Markman et al. (2007) also proposed that additive and 
subtractive counterfactual mindsets appear to elicit the phenomenon of "transfer-
appropriate" processing shifts discussed above.   
Expand Examples: What you see may not be exactly what you get 
Design is coping!  It's not merely a convenience, but a practicality.  Like 
professional designers, ordinary people know where to look to see what to do about 
problems.  Design gives solutions and solves problems, which is how professional 
designers have been taught and trained effectively without sacrificing any creativity so 
long as the outcome is not simply duplication. Ample evidence of this exists in historical 
accounts of innovative design based on earlier examples (e.g. Weber & Perkins, 1992).  
Design literature also reveals that architects who are explicitly instructed to use the visual 
analogy tend to create better results compared to those who are given no explicit 
examples during the idea generation (e.g. Casakin & Goldschmidt, 2000). However, the 
minds of designers (e.g. industrial designers, engineers) may become fixated when they 
are shown examples of earlier solutions prior to idea generation regardless of their 
expertise (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Purcell & Gero, 1996).  Many previous idea 
generation studies (e.g. Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996; Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 
1993) have demonstrated the stifling effect of conformity. In the classic paradigm 
developed by Ward (1994), when asked to imagine animals on other planets participants 
produced words and sketches that looked like typical animals found on Earth, with such 
salient properties as eyes, legs, and bilateral symmetry, despite having been explicitly 
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instructed to generate new ideas and not to copy any features of the examples provided. 
This unintentional phenomenon is termed as "Structured Imagination" (Ward , 1994), 
which is in line with "Inadvertent Plagiarism" (Marsh, Landau, & Hicks, 1996). There is 
an interesting distinction between these two phenomena: in Ward's theory of structured 
imagination, people start with an exemplar by explicit and deliberate instruction and then 
attempt to transform it into new things, whereas people in unconscious plagiarism (Marsh 
et al., 1996) appear to start with common features of the examples they see before 
reassembling them into new forms. The prior information is assumed to be implicit, 
therefore, in the admonition to avoid using it.       
It seems difficult to ask people not to copy from examples, but copying from old 
things may be necessary to acquire new ideas in the creative processes.  In the studies of 
"alien sketches" mentioned above, people had to rely on the principles of categorization, 
like the characteristics of typical category members, whether an explicit or implicit 
contrast between humans or other animals was being considered, (Rosch, 1978; Ward, 
1994).  The properties of animals on Earth listed by the participants, for example, were 
not isolated entities (e.g. bilateral symmetry). Participants appeared to follow the intuition 
of the "goodness of parts," (Tversky & Hemenway, 1984), in which they agreed which 
parts were the basic elements of the whole object and which parts better fit in a coherent 
structure.  Other observations show that category construction can become flexible from 
the priming of recent experiences (Barsalou, 1985). When participants were asked to 
imagine alien animals while being told that their creatures may have feathers and scales, 
they tended to give more ideas related to birds and fish than those in the control group 
(Ward, 1994).  In a sense, people often tend to generate ideas that emanate from memory 
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with the least cognitive effort possible using the path of least resistance (Ward, 1994).  
One seemingly straightforward way to overcome this fixation effect is to "defixate" it 
(Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005).  Researchers used the same paradigm (including the 
pictorial examples, descriptions and instructions) developed by Jansson and Smith in the 
previous study (1991).  It appears that simply ensuring that participants have followed the 
instructions and clarifying any ambiguity caused by the examples can mitigate the effects 
of fixation.   
Providing explicit and specific instruction in order to direct participants to the 
various levels of an object’s abstraction seems very useful in conceptual expansion tasks.  
Ward, Patterson, and Sifonis (2004) continued the series of "alien" studies to examine if 
certain heuristics focusing on the properties of living things can help produce more 
original ideas. Participants were asked to imagine and draw a living creature on another 
planet. The study compared the effects of three sets of instructions.  Participants in the 
exemplar group were told to think of animals on Earth and base their alien off these 
exemplars.  Participants in the abstract instruction group were told to avoid thinking of 
exemplars and think about higher-level issues or functions regarding the survival of 
species (e.g. nutrition for supporting biological processes).  Participants in the control 
group were given no specific instructions on what to think to draw the alien.  The number 
of unusual features presented in the sketches and how different the sketches appeared 
from typical Earth animals were coded. The exemplar group produced far less original 
ideas than the abstraction group and the control group.    
A recent study (Agogué, Kazakçi, Hatchuel, Le Masson, Weil, Poirel, & Cassotti, 
2013) demonstrated that exposure to expansive examples of solutions activates 
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knowledge that is less accessible through the "egg task" according to the Concept-
Knowledge design theory (C-K theory).  Participants had to design many different ways 
to drop a hen's egg from a height of 10 meters without breaking it, and were given an 
expansive example (to freeze the egg before dropping it), a restrictive example (to slow 
its fall with a parachute), or no explicit example.  When the restrictive example 
reinforced common knowledge, participants generated fewer and less original ideas. This 
finding is consistent with the previous research related to design fixation (e.g. Jansson & 
Smith, 1991). On the other hand, providing the unusual expansive example did not seem 
to block creativity and participants yielded even more original ideas instead.  Other 
design experiments (e.g. Perttula & Sipilä, 2007) using an example exposure paradigm 
also corroborate the positive influence of using specific examples.  Perttula & Sipilä 
(2007) also found that common examples deriving from their own reference database 
(one in roughly 15 concepts out of a total amount of 1000) compared to unusual 
examples (one in 100 concepts out of a total amount of 1000) might cause fixation more 
easily.  Seeing the most unusual exemplar might encourage additional new ideas instead 
of mere modifications of the common responses at a lower level of abstraction.   
Studies in the realm of brainstorming have examined whether the quantity of 
ideas has a significant effect on creative outcome.  The paradigm derives from the most 
popular idea generation technique by Osborn (1957) and apparently favored by many 
designers as well (e.g. Gonçalves, Cardoso, & Badke-Schaub, 2014; Kelley & Littman, 
2006).  It has been argued that exposure to the ideas of others helps stimulate the 
associations and hence generates additional ideas (Brown & Paulus, 2002), and the more 
of it the better (e.g. Dugosh & Paulus, 2005).  One recent study (Kudrowitz & Wallace, 
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2013) adapted the so called "blue-sky" brainstorming techniques, free from constraints 
and expected outcomes during the stage of conceptual design, to ask participants to 
sketch their ideas with as few words as possible around three common objects (toasters, 
umbrellas and toothbrushes) in three 12 minute sessions. Unlike in traditional 
brainstorming sessions, participants sat together as a group but did not share ideas with 
others around them.  The results support the notion that generating more ideas means 
performing more creatively, as the quantity of ideas generated by each participant had a 
strong correlation with the overall creative quality of each participant. 
Other laboratory studies have examined various combinatorial processes. For 
example, one paradigm developed by Mobley, Doares, & Mumford (1992) simulated a 
process of idea combination in which participants were presented 15 category-exemplar 
generation problems based either on biological categories or on artifact categories and 
four exemplars from each of three categories (e.g. furniture: chair, couch, table, stool). 
They were asked to develop concepts to explain the grouping of all of them together and 
to label, define, and list new exemplars under this newly combined category.  The initial 
categories were either closely related (e.g. Seat, Tire, Brakes, Wheel) or unrelated (e.g. 
Gas Mask, Needle, Tweezers, Rubber Gloves). The findings indicate that people tend to 
generate more original outcomes, which are often judged to be of a lower solution quality 
(i.e. defined as appropriate with respect to the context in the assigned task) when the 
component objects are more dissimilar.  
Besides using the verbal combination as a way to trigger an abstract mindset, a 
study about mental imagery (e.g. Finke, 1990) found that people who mentally recombine 
various parts from visual forms and connect different concepts without a specific goal 
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might generate more creative ideas. This kind of metacognitive strategies, termed as 
"Constructive Perception" (Suwa & Tversky, 2003) has been identified to enhance 
creative performance in design through the coordination of two processes: reorganizing 
perception and associating ideas.  It appears those professional designers who 
spontaneously adopt this type of strategy often perform better (Suwa & Tversy, 2001).  A 
recent study (Chou & Tversky, 2015) has directly addressed whether conceptual and 
perceptual strategies can help laypeople enhance design ideation.  Participants were asked 
to repeatedly generate new interpretations of ambiguous sketches under four strategy 
conditions: a bottom-up perceptual strategy, a top-down conceptual strategy, both 
strategies, and no strategy. The perceptual strategies gave instructions that professional 
designers reported using often, including reorganizing, reconfiguring, or regrouping the 
figure.  The conceptual strategies gave instructions to think of new domains, settings, 
activities, objects, and organisms.  The both condition gave the instructions of combining 
both perceptual and conceptual strategies and the no-strategy condition provided no 
special instruction. The conceptual strategy had the distinct advantage of generating more 
interpretations for ambiguous design sketch using general world knowledge.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Idea Generation, Memory Search and Social Interaction 
Thus far, various experimental approaches relevant to idea generation have been 
reviewed.  It appears that there are four major directions of studies. First, “incubation 
studies” ask people to take a break immediately or later on when facing with a problem; 
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second, “be creative” studies either give hints to people implicitly or tell them to be 
creative explicitly; third,  “shift perspectives” studies induce different levels of 
abstraction through different perspectives of things; and fourth, “expand examples” 
studies focus on the properties and parts of objects.  It may be difficult to know how 
exactly people come up with a particular idea through certain heuristics.  However, these 
four kinds of studies may represent a scale of heuristic search in a "problem space" 
(Newell and Simon, 1972) to generate new ideas, from letting the mind take its natural 
course to explicitly giving instructions to trigger the abstract mindset. Furthermore, the 
search metaphor seems to serve well for everyday design creativity.  People search for all 
kinds of things every day in both virtual and physical environments: for good chairs, nice 
jazz music, old prints in a flea market, oddly-shaped pebbles on the beach, a lost earring 
on the floor and so on.  Many of the same factors considered when calculating the 
success of everyday searches are just as relevant in the quests of designers: persistence, 
looking in the right places, free associations from different places, questioning 
assumptions about where to look, being efficient about it, and so on (Weber & Perkins, 
1992). 
If the results of many past studies have been inconsistent, it’s probably due to the 
variety of definitions researchers have applied to general heuristics and strategies. The 
diversity of experimental protocols has derived from a bewildering array of Gestaltist and 
Associationist theories, Problem Solving and Social Priming theories, Cognitive Models, 
and more recent neural basis of Creative Cognition studies.  Unlike those insight 
problems with little general application in real daily situations that have been studied 
before, the present dissertation research will focus on everyday design problems, which 
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are often open-ended, ordinarily involving a series of mini-insights while allowing 
incremental progress toward the goal.  The prior studies in generating alternative ideas 
often direct people to focus on the objects themselves, but one plausible way yet to be 
studied is for people to think through the different roles people can take in a society, such 
as chef, doctor, mechanic, and so on.  Social interaction can be observed by means of 
divergent thinking tests in a more generalizable environment (i.e. the Internet).  The 
solution is to collect behavioral data generated by participants over the Internet, which 
would allow us to access to a larger and more diverse pool of potential participants 
worldwide in a very short time.   
Today people have no trouble "Googling" almost anything, but how do we begin 
to select a workable idea among the many possible ideas?  We cannot do it by 
considering them all, not even by considering all possible ideas in the vicinity of the same 
location.  For instance, Perkins (1992) found an example from everyday experience in an 
anecdote of about a friend’s use of a credit card to cut a piece of cheese after forgetting to 
bring a knife to a picnic in the French countryside. In retrospect, how did his friend come 
up with this clever solution?  One possibility is that he focused on the properties similar 
to a cheese knife — something thin and stiff, and so the credit card came to mind. 
Another possibility is that he poked around in his pockets, glove compartments, or the 
trunk of the car for a knife or something else (dental floss would have been a nice 
candidate as well) that might serve in a pinch as a cheese slicer. Perhaps his friend had 
eaten at a bistro not long before and watched a chef at work as he drew out his credit card 
to pay the bill, implicitly building a new association.  Certainly a credit card might evoke 
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different uses under different circumstances (e.g. as a scraper to break ice or remove 
wax).   
The simple credit card story epitomizes how people make discoveries in daily life.  
From a conventional design point of view, the nature of design problems seems to require 
specific domain knowledge.  People with credit cards don’t have to learn how the 
complex financial system between the bank and the merchant works, or how to design a 
plastic card with a magnetic strip to read or write data. As long as they know how to 
swipe it, cardholders don’t need any special knowledge.  On the other hand, people who 
have common and broad real-world knowledge of an object may generate rich sets of 
conceptual ideas through organizing and cross-organizing categories and themes of 
objects, scenes, events and more.  To facilitate the processes of idea generation, people 
often incorporate the process of abstraction to identify any structure, regularity, pattern or 
organization presented by different perceptions (Perkins, 1981, 1992).  Abstraction also 
presents a mental simulation of certain scenarios that encourages people to associate with 
others in different roles and imagine how they might react to incongruent situations 
(Ward, 1994; Hampton, 1997).  In the above example, a bottom-up perceptual heuristic 
would direct people to abstract the necessary properties of a cheese slicer and retrieve 
from memory an ambiguous object that fit the requirement; a top-down conceptual 
heuristic would direct people to shift perspectives through new associations in social 
interaction.  For example, under different situations, people who learn from different 
roles (e.g. musician, physician, librarian, artist, thief) could transform an expired credit 
card into something else (e.g. guitar pick, finger splint, bookmark, earrings, door lock and 
so on).  
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It is from work in cognitive psychology and social psychology over the last 
several decades that we have come to appreciate that we cannot merely impose designs of 
objects on ordinary users and separate laypeople from designers.  Laypeople with their 
various prior experiences should be active parts of the complex design system.  They 
often interpret what they see in their own ways that may be quite beyond designers’ 
original intentions.   
Internet Protocol to Observe Design Behavior Online 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) is a web service that allows Internet users to 
post tasks for other users to generate ideas or produce solutions.  The tasks are termed 
HITs or Human Intelligence Tasks. The person posting the task is called a "requester" 
and those performing the tasks are termed "workers."  Participants receive a small 
amount of money that can depend on the time taken to complete the task as well as the 
quality of their performance.   
In this dissertation research, participants have been recruited through the AMT 
web service.  Many recent studies have shown the benefits of recruiting participants 
through this web service.  Participants can be located in many different places in the 
United States (based on IP address), allowing for a diverse sample of the Internet-using 
population that is representative of its general demographics.  Also, participants can carry 
on the task in their familiar settings and at their own convenience, just as they perform 
tasks in their daily lives.  A huge amount of data is easy to collect, record and tabulate 
within a fairly short period of time.  Other studies have shown that results on AMT are 
comparable to those obtained in the laboratory. More detailed information can be found 
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in the following reports (e.g. Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Mason & Suri, 
2012). 
Measuring Fluency and Originality of Ideas 
In this dissertation research, ideas generated by participants were evaluated on 
quantity (i.e. fluency) and as well as on creative quality (i.e. a degree of originality).  
There is still a debate concerning the different criteria available for analyzing ideas, 
which might bias the assessment of the creativity and innovation.  On one side, the work 
of Silvia et al. (2008), which promoted "average creativity" through a subjective scoring 
method, found some favorable results but penalized those who generated many 
uncreative ideas; on the other side, inconsistent results also suggest that completely 
subjective scoring techniques can be unstable due to the characteristics of the raters 
themselves (Kaufman et al., 2008; Runco, 2008).  
Given that the nature of this study of everyday ingenuity is to promote a fluency 
of ideas in the real world and not to directly impact educational outcomes or admit 
students into gifted programs, it seems proper to use the traditional scoring of originality 
offered by the Sample-Specific Percentage Score.  This method, derived from the classic 
Torrance's (1968) paradigm, depends on the statistical rarity of the idea under 
consideration (Mouchiroud and Lubart, 2001).  Its researchers assigned 2 points for each 
idea given by less than 2% of the sample and 1 point for each idea with a frequency seen 
in 2% to 5% of the sample.  In the present study, an idea generated by one or two 
participants was marked 2 points, an idea that generated by three to five participants 
would be marked 1 point, and an idea that generated by more than five participants would 
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be marked 0 points.  Some researchers have criticized this kind of method failing to 
differentiate the quality of originality from the fluency of responses. For example, a 
participant who gives 10 so-so responses will be more likely to get a higher originality 
score than a participant who gives only 2 answers, even if these 2 answers are highly 
creative.  In the present studies, finding someone who was able to give highly original 
ideas within one or two responses was relatively rare. 
The strong statistical link between fluency and originality of ideas may be open to many 
different interpretations.  One plausible view is that the strong correlation indicates an 
actual link between the two indices.  For example, Simonton’s model of creative 
production (2003) uses a constrained stochastic process to explain creative productivity 
in the domains of science and arts. The theory assumes the need of creators to acquire a 
sample of the larger set of ideas in order to make up a particular domain.  Because of the 
random process of creation, however, most new ideas will be useless and a good idea will 
be generated only occasionally.  It seems reasonable to expect that generating a higher 
number ideas should lead to a higher number of original ideas, but it remains the case that 
most ideas generated through this process can be less original. 
 
PRELIMINARY STUDY: OBJECTS, ROLES, MINDSET MANIPULATIONS 
Introduction 
This study was designed to explore whether providing specific conceptual or 
perceptual strategies would help people generate more unusual ideas compared to the 
group that was asked to free associate. Furthermore, it was designed to identify whether 
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certain kinds of objects would moderate the effects of strategies.  There are four different 
mindset conditions with specific design heuristics: 1) the object-oriented mindset group, 
with a bottom-up perceptual strategy to encourage participants to focus on the physical 
properties of the object; 2) the place-oriented mindset group, with a top-down conceptual 
strategy to encourage participants to think about different situations; 3) the people-
oriented mindset group, with a top-down conceptual strategy to direct participants to 
think about different roles; and 4) the free association mindset group, with a mind-
wandering strategy to let participants associate freely with things that come to mind.  
Participants were presented with a set of 9 objects that were divided into 3 groups loosely 
based on the complexity level of the object, from simple to more complex objects: a 
tennis ball, aluminum foil, a plastic bag, dental floss, a broom, a car tire, a flashlight, a 
chair, and an umbrella.  There are four sequences of objects. The first sequence was from 
the simpler to the more complex objects. The second sequence was from the more 
complex to the simpler objects. The third and fourth sequences were mixed.  These four 
sequences were randomly assigned to participants. 
Participants 
A total of 68 adults (29 women, 39 men) were recruited through the Amazon 
Mechanical Turks Web service. They were paid $5.5 to participate in the study for 
approximately 45 min.  The age of participants ranged from 18 to 59, and the mean age 
was 30.56.  Participants had a wide range of educational backgrounds and work 
experiences.  There were 11 women and 6 men in the object-oriented mindset group, 10 
women and 7 men in the place-oriented mindset group, 7 women and 10 men in the 
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people-oriented mindset group and 11 women and 6 men in the free association mindset 
group. 
Procedure 
The following general instructions were given to each group in the beginning:  
On each trial you will be presented with the name of the object. 
Your job is to produce as many different novel uses as you can, 
uses that are different from the normal use. You will type your 
ideas in a text box, using only a few words, one idea at a time. Do 
not repeat ideas. Eventually, you may run out of new ideas and 
then you can proceed to the next object and generate new ideas for 
it. There are nine objects. You will have 5 minutes to generate 
novel uses for each object. 
Participants were also informed: “In generating new uses for each object, it’s OK 
to use more than one of the objects and it’s OK to use parts of the object.” 
Then names of nine objects were presented to each four experimental groups. 
These items were: tennis ball, aluminum foil, plastic bag, dental floss, broom, car tire, 
flashlight, chair, and umbrella.  In each case, the common use was presented under the 
name of the object on the screen.  Participants were randomly assigned to four mindset 
groups with the specific strategy. The instruction for the object-oriented mindset group 
asked participants to “Think about the physical properties of the object.  What are its 
parts and how are they configured? What properties do the parts and whole have, think of 
the size, shape, color, texture, volume, weight, density, absorbency, strength, flexibility 
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and so on.”  The instruction for the place-oriented mindset group asked participants to 
“Think about other situations for the object. Situations might include home, office, 
school, theater, restaurant, bar, hotel, airport, hospital, stores, museum, beach, mountains, 
forest, and more.”  The instruction for the people-oriented mindset group asked 
participants to “Think about other roles of the people who might use the object.  Other 
roles might include chef, car mechanics, artist, teacher, musician, plumber, lawyer, 
physician, dancer, football player, pilot, bartender, gardener, firefighter and more.” The 
instruction for the free association group asked participants to “Remember to think of 
free associations to the object as you think of new uses.”  
Results  
The participants in the preliminary study generated more than 4000 responses.  
The descriptive statistics demonstrated that participants who were asked to think of 
different roles generated more new uses (M = 66.88, SD = 36.40) than those who were 
asked to free associate (M = 57.88, SD = 24.01) and those asked to think of properties of 
the objects (M = 57.76, SD = 32.78) or different situations in which to use the objects (M 
= 53.41, SD = 29.45) in Figure 1-1.  The possible outcomes between the two specific 
mindset conditions (roles vs. free association) were further verified.  First, a mixed 
ANOVA was used to determine if there was an interaction between the objects and 
mindset conditions on the idea generation.  There was a statistically significant 
interaction between the two mindset conditions (different roles vs. free associations) and 
the level of complexity for objects (one salient part / two salient parts / three salient parts) 
on the number of ideas generated by participants, F (2,64) = 3.927, p = .025, partial η2 = 
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.109.  The simple main effect for the mindset condition was tested as well.  However, 
there was no main effect for the overall mindset condition due to a large SD in both roles 











Figure 1-1.  Mean total number of ideas for four mindset conditions in the preliminary study. 
 
Further, an independent-samples t-test was run to determine if there were 
differences in the number of new uses generated between participants in the different 
roles and free associations mindset conditions.  Since there were outliers in the data as 
assessed by inspection of a boxplot, the extreme values were removed; in other words, 
participants who generated the highest and lowest number of uses in the conditions of 
different roles (case# 2 and 16) and free associations (case# 26 and 21) were not included 
in this analysis. There was no significant difference in the average number of ideas for all 
nine objects between these two mindset conditions, M = 9.73, 95% CI [-3.16, 22.62], 
t(28) = 1.547, p = .133.  However, if the results from only the more complex objects are 
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participants using the roles mindset revealed the effect of strategy. Those participants 
using the roles mindset did generate more new uses (M = 32.07, SD = 10.96) than those 
using free associations (M = 23.27, SD = 8.23), a statistically significant difference, M = 
8.80, 95% CI [1.55, 16.05], t (28) = 2.487, p = .019.  For exploratory purposes, below is 
the bar graph showing which objects were more productive than others (Figure 1-2).  It 
appears that strategy did not help when participants were presented with simpler objects.  
That is, participants in the role condition and those in the free association condition 
generated a more or less equal amount of ideas. However, the strategy of roles seemed to 
affect performance when participants were presented with certain objects that were more 
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Discussion 
This preliminary study was designed to explore certain objects and roles that are 
potentially accessible to ordinary people.  There are some highly encouraging results 
concerning the mindset conditions as well.  The results show there is a difference 
between different manipulations.  Certain objects — such as the broom, the flashlight, the 
chair, the umbrella, and the car tire — did elicit more responses than other objects.  
Importantly, thinking of different roles did lead people to give more original uses.  It 
seems plausible that roles serve as excellent heuristics for situations where people often 
interact with each other or interact with objects in society, while generating situations 
alone is harder without any cues.   
It is also noteworthy that some specific roles mentioned in the instructions seem 
to generate more uses than other roles.  It appears that activities are defined by roles 
despite the fact that some of them are not professional categories (such as “camper” or 
“tramp”).  In the present study, if one participant used the role more than one time, it 
would be counted only once unless the role solicited different functions.  For example, 
"Athlete" includes many different roles related to sportsmen (e.g. golfer, baseball player, 
etc.) and "Fictional Role" includes those characters or props in movies, novels (e.g. Mary 
Poppings, Batman, Star Wars, Harry Potter) or historical themes (e.g. knight, princess, 
shaman).  Participants used different stereotyped roles to generate uses quickly, which 
definitely encouraged the fluency of ideas.  It indicates that some roles may inspire 
creative exploration and some roles may help generate different functions. The "creative 
quality" of these responses would need to be verified in a further study, however. There 
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might be a distinction between remembering from past experience and generating new 
uses from the self-described roles.  What kind of a role triggers better or more ideas? Is it 
the role provided in the strategy or the role invented by participants themselves that helps 
enhance idea generation?  It's all about the roles people can play. In a sense, participants 
are acting as both designers and users for this kind of task. Should the stereotyped 
expectations for the roles work, or their dynamic attributes?  These questions may not be 
easily answered without the further clarification.  
STUDY 1: MINDSET EFFECTS: HUMAN-CENTRIC VS. MIND-WANDERING 
 
According to the promising results of the preliminary study, there are certain 
objects that elicit more responses from participants than others, particularly those that can 
be deconstructed into parts, such as a broom, a chair, an umbrella, a flashlight and a car 
tire.   Also, thinking about different roles led people to suggest more original uses.  To 
confirm the evidence of the preliminary study, this study was designed to verify the 
effects of mindsets with better-chosen objects.  In the present study, six objects (broom, 
flashlight, chair, umbrella, shoe, and smartphone) were chosen.  The first four objects 
were presented in the preliminary study.   Instead of using a car tire for this study, a shoe 
was chosen because it is an equally commonplace object and is also the item that appears 
most frequently in the Alternate Uses Task (other than a brick).  In addition, a brick 
cannot be deconstructed into parts, but a shoe can be.  A smartphone is representative of 
contemporary and future design challenges.   
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This study was to focus on two mindset conditions, Mind-Wandering and Human-
Centric, and compare them to the Control group.  In fact, the Human-Centric and Mind-
Wandering mindsets represent two common beliefs among designers regarding 
inspiration. The Human-Centric approach has been implemented by many prominent 
design consultancies like IDEO to prime roles and settings to solve problems through 
different types of people.  The approach has evolved from the “10 people-centric tools for 
innovation” developed at IDEO. These tools advocate, for example, the learning persona 
as a kind of cross-pollinator to create new ideas through the unexpected pair of unrelated 
concepts (Kelley & Littman, 2006).  Until recently, this kind of design thinking mode has 
been transformed into a “poverty fighting tool” to overcome design challenges in the 
social sector of the world.   
Mind-Wandering, as one of the most ubiquitous mental activities, has been hailed 
to facilitate creative incubation. A number of other studies have done much to popularize 
Mind-Wandering as a research topic (e.g. Callard, Smallwood, Golchert, & Margulies, 
2013).  Mind-Wandering has been associated with activity in a default mode network of 
brain regions that are active when the brain is “at rest.” One empirical study (Baird et al, 
2012) implied that engaging in mind-wandering (through a low working memory demand 
task) would enhance idea generation in the Alternate Uses Task. Another recently 
published study (Hao, Wu, Runco, & Pina, 2015), however, suggested a negative 
correlation between mind-wandering and the originality of ideas, that is, people who had 
greater mind-wandering tended to generate less original uses.   
Regardless, this study was designed to directly compare both Human-Centric and 
Mind-Wandering mindset conditions triggered by the strategy of heuristic search since no 
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published study has yet done so.  If our minds are adrift as much as half of our waking 
lives, as suggested in a much quoted finding published by Science (Killingsworth and 
Gilbert, 2010), it seems plausible to assume that telling participants in the Mind-
Wandering mindset group to relax and let things come to them would aggravate the 
situation of mind-wandering; on the other hand, directing participants in Human-Centric 
mindset group to think of different roles would mitigate the circumstances of mind-
wandering. Participants in the Control group would have maintained the existing 
frequency of mind-wandering.   It was predicted that the Human-Centric mindset group 
would be able to generate more uses and more original ideas as demonstrated in the 
preliminary study.  It was also predicted that participants in the Mind-Wandering group 
would have more or less the same results as those in the Control group.   
Participants  
One hundred and five adults were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turks 
Web service, receiving $5 for approximately 40 minutes of time.  The age of the 
participants ranged from 21-65, and mean age was 33.19.  Participants came from a wide 
range of educational backgrounds.  The gender ratios in 3 groups were more or less 
balanced.  Participants were assigned randomly to the three mindset conditions with 
different search heuristics. There were 18 women and 17 men in the Mind-Wandering 
Group, 15 women and 20 men in the Human-Centric Group, 18 women and 17 men in 
the Control Group.  
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Procedure  
Participants were greeted with an introduction about everyday ingenuity on the 
first screen they saw. Similar to the procedure in the preliminary study, people were 
confronted with problems that forced them to improvise through common household 
objects — using a hanger to grab something out of reach, for example, or rolling up a 
magazine to swat flies. Then, they were invited to discover and generate uncommon uses 
for six ordinary objects.  The following general instructions were first given to all of three 
mindset conditions (Mind-Wandering Group / Human-Centric Group / Control Group):   
On each trial you will be presented with the name of the object. 
Your job is to produce as many different novel uses as you can, 
uses that are different from the normal use. You will type your 
ideas in a text box, using only a few words, one idea at a time.  
Please do not repeat ideas.  Eventually, you may run out of new 
ideas and then you will have a chance to proceed to the next object 
and generate new ideas for it.  There are SIX objects. You will 
have 5 minutes to generate novel uses for each object.  Please do 
not use any resources besides your own creative mind in this task.  
Participants were also instructed: "It's OK to use more than one of the 
objects and it’s OK to use parts of the object."  
Participants were then presented with the names of six objects, one at a time, for 
the unusual uses task: Broom, Flashlight, Chair, Umbrella, Shoe, and Smart Phone. Each 
of those 5 objects except for Smart Phone was randomly assigned to each participant.  
After they finished generating ideas with those 5 objects, the Smart Phone was the last 
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object to be presented along with a new instruction by adding a paragraph, “Now that 
you’ve warmed up generating new uses for old objects, try your mind at generating new 
uses, including new apps, for a smart phone you see below.” In each case, the common 
use was presented under the name of the object on the screen.  Participants in the Mind-
Wandering group were told that "One proven way to generate new ideas is to simply 
relax and let your mind wander. Please use that mindset to generate as many new uses as 
you can think of." Participants in the Human-Centric group were told that "One proven 
way to generate new ideas is to imagine how different people in different roles might 
reuse the objects in their activities. Other roles might include various kinds of athletes, 
gardeners, artists, chefs, musicians, mechanics, craftspeople, dancers, teachers, police, 
firefighters, plumbers, tailors, architects, physicians, writers and more. Please imagine the 
mindset of a variety of roles to generate as many new uses as you can think of."  The 
Control group was not given any specific strategy or exemplars.  Each participant had a 
practice trial with clothes hanger for 3 minutes before starting the real experiment.  
In the post-task section, participants answered a questionnaire concerning the 
mindset manipulation.  A diagram of the procedure for Study 1 is shown in Appendix A. 
Two screenshots of the human-centric mindset condition are shown in Appendix B — 
note the interface before and after participants entered responses; each response was 
assigned a position number by the system. 
Coding 
To count the number of ideas, the task was coded using a two-step process. First, 
responses were put through a spreadsheet that (a) counted the total number of answers, 
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and (b) identified the likely original answers by eliminating all duplicates. During the 
initial examination, all duplicate answers ("duplicate" means that someone deliberately 
listed identical ideas for the object) were removed; total numbers generated for each 
participant were accurate, and all the unusual / unique answers were identified. 
Generalized items (e.g., “a broom to clean off the cobweb on the ceiling”) were counted 
toward a participant’s total number of responses but were not coded as original.  
Appendix C shows how to code the originality of ideas, and the scoring method derived 
from the classic Torrance's (1968) paradigm was adopted.  Those more original and most 
ordinary examples are provided in Appendix D. 
Results 
Fluency of Ideas 
In terms of fluency (i.e. total number of ideas), there was a difference among the 3 
mindset groups; the Human-Centric group (M = 54.06, SD = 27.30) generated a much 
higher number of ideas than the Mind-Wandering (M = 38.77, SD = 15.52) and Control 
groups (M = 36.54, SD = 17.05) in Figure 2-1.  Because the Levene's test turned out to be 
significant (p < .001), proving that variances in the Human-Centric group were extremely 
different and violating the assumption of homogeneity of variance, a more robust  
Games-Howell method (instead of Tukey HSD) was applied to interpret the F statistics 
for the post hoc results.  The Welch's Robust ANOVA was used, and indicated a 
significant difference among the participants of three mindset groups in terms of the ideas 
they generated, F (2, 65.38) = 5.407, p = .007.  Furthermore, the Games-Howell post hoc 
testing revealed that participants using the search strategy of roles in the Human-Centric 
mindset group generated more ideas than those using the mind-wandering mindset, a 
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mean increase of 15.229, 95% CI [2.18 to 28.27]. There was also a mean increase of 
17.514, 95% CI [4.42 to 30.61] between the Human-Centric and Control groups, but 
there was no significant mean difference between the Mind-Wandering and Control 
groups, 2.229, 95% CI [-7.11 to 11.57].  The mean number of ideas generated by each 





























































Figure 2-2.  Mean Number of ideas across 6 objects. 
 
 
Originality of Ideas 
In terms of originality, the Levene's test was significant, and the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated.  The Welch test table was applied. There was a 
significant effect for the three mindset conditions F (2, 67.21) = 4.34, p = .017.  The post-
hoc comparison using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean score of originality 
for the Human-Centric group (M = 31.89, SD = 21.67) was significantly different than the 
Mind-Wandering group (M = 20.43, SD = 16.61). Also, the Human-Centric group was 
significantly different than the Control group (M = 18.77, SD = 17.12). However, the 

























































Figure 2-3. Human-Centric mindset generated more original ideas than Mind-Wandering and 
Control groups. 
Discussion 
 Despite many anecdotes reporting the beneficial effects of human inspiration in 
design case studies, the results of this study provide empirical support for the creativity of 
the Human-Centric mindset triggered by the heuristics of roles.  The results show that 
participants who were asked to think about different roles in the Human-Centric mindset 
condition generated more uses and more original ideas than those who were in the Mind-
Wandering mindset condition and the Control group.  Through the manipulation of 
mindsets, this study also verified that participants in the Mind-Wandering condition 
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Besides the sheer of number of new uses and the assessment of creative quality, 
there might be other potential dependent variables (DVs).  Is it possible to verify whether 
participants really took advantage of the strategies of roles given or whether they came up 
with their own heuristics during the generative process?   Regarding how often people 
used the suggested heuristics to generate ideas, it appears that more than 70% of 
participants in both the Human-Centric and Mind-Wandering groups claimed that they 
did follow the instruction.  Regarding how easily people used the suggested heuristics to 
generate ideas, it appears that half of the participants in both Mind-Wandering and 
Human-Centric groups self-reported that it was easy.  However, the initial data with the 
actual responses participants generated told a different story. It appears that people in the 
Mind-Wandering group didn't get to generate more and original responses even though 
they thought the specific heuristic that let things come to mind was very easy or easy to 
adopt.  Regarding the helpfulness of the suggested heuristics to generate ideas, most 
participants in both groups (69% in the Human-Centric group and 60% in the Mind-
Wandering group) did think it was helpful with the suggested heuristics. Again the data 
reveals that people who thought the mindset was helpful didn't necessary generate more 
and original ideas.  
 
STUDY 2: PICTORIAL STIMULI AND HEURISTICS OF ROLES  
 
The second study was designed to confirm whether participants in the Human-
Centric mindset condition do generate more uses and original ideas than those in the 
Mind-Wandering mindset condition as found in the first study.  Furthermore, the second 
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study added pictorial stimuli as a factor to verify whether pictures could be a moderator 
in the process of generating new ideas.  Moreover, to date no published studies have 
directly compared the effect between pictures and names of common objects.  A 2x2 
between-subject factorial design was used. It was predicted that a picture would inspire 
much broader word associations than a name, while the image of a specific object would 
also cause people to become fixated and possibly hinder their idea generation.  
Besides varying stimuli to assess effects on the quantity / quality of alternative 
uses, response time between ideas and mindset conditions across objects was measured. It 
seems plausible that response time between ideas generated in different mindset 
conditions should be different regardless of other factors (e.g. typing speed, background 
noise).  Assuming that the directed search strategy worked, participants in the Human-
Centric mindset groups should have a shorter span of response time for each idea than 
those in the Mind-Wandering mindset groups.  More over, the correlations between the 
heuristics of roles and the quality / quantity of ideas were examined as well.  The results 
in the previous two studies showed that some specific roles mentioned in the provided 
strategy seemed to generate more uses than other roles.  This study would confirm that 
participants who were more original used more different roles, and likewise that 
participants who generated more uses also adopted more different roles.  
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Participants 
One hundred and forty-eight participants1 were recruited through the Amazon 
Mechanical Turks Web service, receiving US$5.50 to work on the idea generation task 
for approximately 45 minutes.  The age of participants was in the range of 19-69, while 
the mean age was 35.  Participants came from a wide range of educational backgrounds 
and work experiences.  The gender ratios in 4 groups were more or less balanced.  
Participants were assigned randomly to four experimental conditions.  There were 20 
women and 17 men in the Mind-Wandering with Pictorial Stimuli Group, 18 women and 
18 men in the Mind-Wandering without Pictorial Stimuli Group, 22 women and 16 men 
in the Human-Centric with Pictorial Stimuli Group, 25 women and 12 men in the Mind-
Wandering without Pictorial Stimuli Group. 
Stimuli 
A quick norm study was conducted to select the right kind of pictures for each 
object.  From various line drawings from many sources including A Standardized Set of 
260 Pictures (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980), Google images, and more, 12 
independent raters ranked 4 representative drawings for each object by typicality. The 
                                                
1 A few problematic subjects have been identified in each condition. There are a few data entry errors due 
to the original data recording in error and cannot not be correctable. 12 participants need to be removed 
from the dataset before transferring to SPSS. Subjects were filtered out of the original dataset:  
- 5 participants incidentally took the task twice, so the second set of responses cannot be included (2 
subjects in the MW + P and 3 subjects in the MW).  
- 4 participants who spent very short time on each object and either left it blank or gave no more than 2 
responses for each object (1 subject in the MW + P; 1 subject in the MW; 1 subject in the HC + P; 1 subject 
in the HC).  
- 3 participants who were not native English speakers and gave a few identical or redundant responses (1 
subject in the HC+ P; 2 subjects in the HC). 
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standardization of the drawing styles is meant to provide consistency of pictorial 
representation (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980).  The three-quarter orientation is based 
on a prior study of "canonical perspective" (Palmer, Rosch and Chase, 1981). Here are 












Figure 3-1.  Pictorial stimuli were selected according to the typicality of objects. 
Procedure 
This is a 2x2 between-subject factorial design. One factor is strategy (Mind-
Wandering / Human-Centric) and the other factor is stimuli (pictures / words).  Similar to 
the procedure used in the preliminary study and the first study, participants had to face an 
ill-structured everyday problem with common household objects and attempt to come up 
with as many unusual uses of the object as possible (using a yogurt cup to sort bolts and 
small parts, for example, or replacing a broken shoelace with dental floss). Participants 
had the chance to discover and generate uncommon uses of six ordinary objects one at a 
time. 
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The following general instructions were given to all four conditions (Mind-
Wandering with Pictorial Stimuli (MW+P) group; Mind-Wandering without Pictorial 
stimuli (MW) group; Human-Centric with Pictorial stimuli (HC+P) group; Human-
Centric without Pictorial stimuli (HC); the pictorial stimuli groups read "the line drawing 
of the object" and the other two groups without the pictorial stimuli read "the name of the 
object," as presented in the previous two studies):      
On each trial you will be presented with the name (or the line 
drawing) of the object. Your job is to produce as many different 
novel uses as you can, uses that are different from the normal use. 
You will type your ideas in a text box, using only a few words, one 
idea at a time.  Please do not repeat ideas.  Eventually, you may 
run out of new ideas and then you will have a chance to proceed to 
the next object and generate new ideas for it. There are SIX 
objects. You will have 5 minutes to generate novel uses for each 
object.  Please do not use any resources besides your own creative 
mind in this task.  
Participants were then presented with either the visual stimuli or the name of six 
objects, one at a time, for the unusual uses task: Broom, Flashlight, Chair, Umbrella, 
Shoe, and Smart Phone. Each of those 5 objects, except for the Smart Phone, was 
randomly assigned to each participant.  After participants finished generating ideas with 
those 5 objects, the Smart Phone was the last object to be presented along with a new 
instruction encouraging them to consider new apps as part of the idea generation process 
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for that object. In each case, the common use was presented under the name of the object 
on the screen or embedded in the sentence if in the condition of pictorial stimuli. 
To take "broom" as an example for the specific task strategy, participants in the 
MW + P group were told that "One proven way to generate new ideas is to simply relax 
and let your mind wander. Please use that mindset to generate as many new uses as you 
can think of. One common use for this object is to sweep floors." Participants in the MW 
group were told that "One proven way to generate new ideas is to simply relax and let 
your mind wander. Please use that mindset to generate as many new uses as you can 
think of."  Participants in the HC + P group were told that "One proven way to generate 
new ideas is to imagine how different people in different roles might reuse the objects in 
their activities. Other roles might include various kinds of athletes, gardeners, artists, 
chefs, musicians, mechanics, dancers, teachers, police, firefighters, plumbers, tailors, 
architects, physicians, and more. Please imagine the mindset of a variety of roles to 
generate as many new uses as you can think of. One common use for this object is to 
sweep floors."  Participants in the HC group were told that "One proven way to generate 
new ideas is to imagine how different people in different roles might reuse the objects in 
their activities. Other roles might include various kinds of athletes, gardeners, artists, 
chefs, musicians, mechanics, dancers, teachers, police, firefighters, plumbers, tailors, 
architects, physicians, and more. Please imagine the mindset of a variety of roles to 
generate as many new uses as you can think of." 
After the completion of the idea generation task for each object, participants were 
asked to indicate which of their ideas were completely novel – that is, which ideas they 
hadn’t see or heard or thought of before.  They were asked to put the corresponding 
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number of each completely novel idea in the textbox.  In the post-task section, 
participants answered a questionnaire concerning the mindset manipulation.  The diagram 
for the procedure for Study 2 is shown in Appendix E.  Screenshots for 4 mindset 
conditions with pictures or words only are shown in Appendix F.  
Results 
The ideas generated in the alternate uses task were scored for fluency and 
originality. The participants in this study generated 6265 responses across 6 objects in the 
final set of data. In terms of fluency of ideas, the total number of responses was counted 
and duplicates were eliminated within each set of responses given by the same 
participant.  Common uses for items (e.g., “a broom to clean off the cobweb on the 
ceiling”) were also included toward a participant’s total number of responses, but would 
be marked “0” for the score of originality because of the likelihood that more than 5% of 
the sample would have given identical ideas.  
Fluency of Ideas 
 A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of strategy and 
stimuli on the number of ideas generated across 6 objects. The strategy of heuristic search 
included two levels (Mind-Wandering Mindset, Human-Centric Mindset); the stimuli 
consisted of two levels (pictures, without pictures).   Two outliers in the MW group and 
three outliers in the HC + Pictures group were identified.  These outliers were kept since 
there was no good reason to reject them as invalid.   The moderately and positively 
skewed data was converted to normality by applying a "square root" transformation and 
then checking skewness and kurtosis values to evaluate the normality again. The 
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transformed DV (residuals) had been approximately normally distributed for each cell of 
the design. The Levene's test was not significant (p = .223), so the assumption of the 
homogeneity of variances was not violated. 
The main effect of stimuli on the number of ideas was not significant  
(F (1,144) = .659, p = . 418) but the main effect of strategy on the number of ideas was 
significant to the extent that participants who were given strategy to trigger human-
centric mindset generated more ideas than those who were induced to the mind-














Figure 3-2.  Effects of strategy between the Mind-Wandering and Human-Centric mindsets on the 
quantity of ideas. 
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There was a statistically significant interaction between the effect of strategy and 
stimuli, F(1, 144) = 6.227, p = .014, partial η2 = .041.  Therefore, an analysis of simple 
main effects for strategy was performed.  A statistically significant difference was found 
between the mean of number of ideas generated by the Human Centric and Mind-
Wandering mindset conditions when participants were not presented with pictorial 
stimuli. Participants in the Human Centric mindset condition (M = 7.22, SD = 1.49) 
generated more ideas than the Mind Wandering mindset group (M = 5.64, SD = 1.30), a 
statistically significant mean difference of 1.58, 95% CI [.97, 2.19], F (1, 144) = 26.40, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .155 in Figure 3-2 
When participants were presented with pictorial stimuli, the Human Centric 
mindset condition (M = 6.01, SD = 1.06) also generated more ideas than the Mind 
Wandering mindset (M = 6.51, SD = 1.37), but a mean difference of .50, 95% CI[-.10, 
1.10], F(1,144) = 2.74, p = .10, partial η2 = .019, which was not statistically significant. It 
appears that the pictorial stimuli impeded the performance of the Human Centric mindset 
group, and participants presented with the pictorial stimuli (M = 6.51, SD = 1.37) had a 
significantly lower number of ideas than those without pictorial stimuli (M = 7.22, SD = 
1.49), a mean difference of -.72, 95% CI [-1.32, -.12], F(1, 144) = 5.54, p = .02, partial η2 
= .037. 
While the pictorial stimuli helped increase the performance of the Mind 
Wandering mindset group, participants presented with the pictorial stimuli (M =6.01, SD 
=1.06) had more ideas than those without pictorial stimuli (M =5.64, SD = 1.30) and 
there was no significant mean difference, .36, 95% CI [-.24, .97], F(1,144) = 1.40, p = 
.239, partial η2 = .010. 
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Originality of Ideas 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of strategy and stimuli 
on the originality of ideas. The same procedure was adopted to examine the same data set 
across 6 objects as in the previous study. The classic Torrance's scoring method used in 
the preliminary study was again used to check the statistical rarity of the ideas.  Two 
points were assigned for each idea given by participants seen in less than 2% of the 
sample (i.e. one idea generated 1 to 3 times among 148 participants with more than 1000 
responses for each object) and 1 point for each idea seen in 2%-5% of the sample (i.e. 
one idea generated 4 to 8 times among 148 participants with more than 1000 responses 
for each object).   
The main effect of stimuli on the originality of ideas was not significant (F 
(1,144) = .025, p = . 874) but the main effect of strategy on the number of ideas was 
significant such that participants who were given strategy to trigger the human-centric 
mindset had higher scores of originality than those in which the mind-wandering mindset 
was induced, (F (1, 144) = 13.587, p < .001). 
There was a statistically significant interaction between the effect of strategy and 
stimuli for the frequency of new uses, F (1, 144) = 4.243, p = .041, partial η2 = .029.  
Therefore, an analysis of simple main effects for strategy was performed. The effect of 
strategy was significant overall, but the effect of stimuli was not. In terms of the effect of 
strategy, when presented with the pictorial stimuli participants in the Human-Centric 
mindset condition (M = 4.83, SD = 1.62) still had more original ideas than those in the 
Mind-Wandering mindset (M =4.37, SD = 1.40), but there was no significant difference; 
participants in the Mind-Wandering mindset condition (M = 3.76, SD = 1.76) without the 
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pictorial stimuli had significantly less original ideas than those in the Human-Centric 
mindset (M = 5.36, SD = 1.93), a mean difference of -1.598, 95% CI [-2.38, -.815], F (1, 



















Figure 3-3.  Effects of strategy between the Mind-Wandering and Human-Centric mindsets on the 
originality of ideas. 
 
 
In terms of the effect of stimuli, there was no significant difference in originality 
between the two stimuli conditions for participants in the Human-Centric mindset group, 
but participants with pictorial stimuli (M = 5.36, SD = 1.93) did generate less original 
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difference in originality between the two stimuli conditions for participants in the Mind-
Wandering mindset group either, but participants with pictorial stimuli (M = 4.37, SD = 
1.40) did generate more original ideas than those without pictorial stimuli (M= 3.76, SD 
= 1.76). 
Response Time between Ideas 
One way to infer whether different strategies of heuristic search worked 
differently is to check the overall time difference in the search for ideas between the 
Mind-Wandering and Human-Centric mindset conditions.  It is worth exploring the 
“whole” picture of the process of idea generation.  The graph of IdeaScape (Appendix G) 
reveals a consistently different pattern between the Mind-Wandering and Human-Centric 
mindset groups for each object.  The mean response time is the average of time that 
participants spent on generating their ideas. The position of ideas has been set from the 1st 
position to the 10th position, but there were only a few samples left for the later position 
(i.e. from the 8th to the 10th , particularly in MW and MW+P groups).  As expected, there 
seems to be a small trend towards taking greater time to generate ideas later despite all 
other possible factors and noise (e.g. typing time).  It appears that the Human-Centric 
(HC) group would generally spend less time generating each idea than the Mind-
Wandering (MW) group while steadily following the zig-zag pattern.     
To verify if there was an overall time difference between HC and MW groups, a 
two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of strategy and the position of 
ideas, with response time between ideas identified as DV.  It is to be anticipated that this 
kind of dataset (i.e. respond time between ideas) would violate assumptions of “no 
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outliers”, “normality” and “homogeneity of variances” (since these assumptions all relate 
to the errors of the model). Since the purpose of this was to simply test the DV value than 
to compute the residuals, the analysis proceeded even when the data violated those 
assumptions. The test was run with all 5228 ideas to look at trends for the first eight 
positions for the MW and HC groups collapsing over object and stimuli.  The descriptive 
statistics of mean response time for generating ideas at each position is shown in 
Appendix H. 
It appears there was no statistically significant interaction effect on response time 
between the strategy and position of ideas, F (7, 5212) = .647, p = .717 in  











Figure 3-4.  Response timing between Mind-Wandering and Human-Centric mindset groups. 
The test of the main effect of strategy boils down to a comparison between two 
means of response time of 8 positions: a marginal mean of 32.906 for the Mind-
Wandering and 25.792 for the Human-Centric mindset group.  It would appear that ideas 
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that were generated in the Mind-Wandering condition required more time than those 
which were generated in the Human-Centric condition. There was also a statistically 
significant main effect of strategy; the MW group had significantly higher mean of 
response time than the HC, 7.113, 95% CI [5.559, 8.667], F (1, 5212) = 80.493, p < 
.001.  It did take longer for participants to generate ideas using the mindset strategy of 
Mind-Wandering; one the other hand, those who were able to use the Human-Centric 
strategy were able to persist in idea generation for a longer period of time.  Perhaps those 
in the Human-Centric mindset group had a systematic way to search for ideas and 
therefore found more original ideas.   
	  
Heuristics of Roles: Provided Roles and Invented Roles 
Once we learned from the previous analyses that people in the Human-Centric 
mindset group perform better in terms of generating more ideas and more original ideas 
than the Mind-Wandering group, it became worth investigating what type of roles people 
tended to adopt to generate ideas.  Did participants in the HC group tend to use the same 
roles over and over?  Did participants use a greater number of roles in general, or did 
their increased use of roles depend on the objects? 
There seemed to be no clear-cut way to code, but a more conservative rule was 
adopted. Only those ideas that related to certain plausible roles or keywords were 
assigned a role, since those ideas would not be the products of mere free association. For 
example, a response of "chair for serving food" cannot be assigned as a "chef," but it 
seems plausible to assign a response of "smartphone as digital scale for small 
ingredients" as a "chef."  Fifty percent of the responses in the Human-Centric mindset 
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groups (P or W) were coded by both the author and another researcher in cognitive 
psychology.  Both coders used the same coding examples as a guide.  Disagreements 
were resolved through discussions. The author continued to code the remainder of the 
responses.  Coding examples of some random subjects are shown in Appendix I.   
Of the total 3686 ideas, 1900 (more than 52%) could be assigned a role, including 
42 percent of those roles provided in the instruction of search heuristics (Provided Role) 
and 10 percent of those roles indicated or invented by participants themselves (Invented 








Figure 3-5.  Pie chart shows the percentage of assignable ideas in the Human-Centric mindset 
groups (Pictures or Words). 
 Indeed, there were more frequent roles in general. Both the provided roles and 
invented roles were counted in terms of the number of ideas summed over all participants 
and 6 objects. A comprehensive list of provided roles and invented roles (many 
specific roles that appeared only once or twice were indicated by participants themselves) 
can be viewed in Figures 3-6 and 3-7.   It appears that “artist,” “gardener,” “athlete,” 
“police,” and “mechanic” were among the more frequently provided roles adopted by 
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“Photographer” were among the more frequently invented roles indicated by participants.  
All fifteen roles listed in the instruction for the provided roles and the invented roles 
indicated participants are illustrated in Figure 3-8. Those specific roles that only appeared 
once or twice, such as “hairdresser” or “cyclist,” had to be lumped together under 
"others” in the bar graph representing the invented roles. One early concern was that a 
few participants would always use “artist” and some others would always use “gardener” 
or “athlete.”  It seems that every provided role was adopted; nevertheless, it makes sense 
to see that some roles worked better for some objects.  For example, “artist” and “athlete” 
are more frequent roles for the broom; “police” and “mechanic” for the flashlight; 
“athlete” and “artist” for the chair; “gardener” and “athlete” for the umbrella; “gardener” 
and “mechanic” for the shoe; and “physician” and “chef” for the smartphone.  A detailed 
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 It appears that participants who were more original used more different roles.  A 
Pearson's Correlation was run to assess the relationship between the originality and the 
diversity of roles used by participants (different roles, regardless of whether they were 
provided or invented, were counted once).  It appears there was a large positive 
correlation between the originality and the diversity of roles, r(73) = .818, p < .001, with 
the possibility of using more different roles explaining more than 67% of the variation in 
the generation of more original ideas. People who used many different roles (vs. few 
roles) did generate more original ideas. Participants were divided into a more original 
group and less original one according to the Median score of originality (24) and the 
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Likewise, participants who generated more ideas also used more different roles.  
A Pearson's Correlation was also run to assess the relationship between the fluency and 
the diversity of roles used by participants. It appears that there was also a positive 
correlation between the fluency and the diversity of roles, r(73) = .700, p < .001, with the 
possibility of using more different roles accounting for approximately 49% of the 
variation in the generation of more ideas. People who used many different roles did 
generate more ideas. This finding is consistent with the previous results concerning the 
correlation between originality and fluency. Participants were divided into a more fluent 
group and less fluent one according to the Median number of ideas (44) and the 












Figure 3-10. The correlation between the diversity of roles and the fluency of ideas. 
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Fluency of Original Ideas 
 A Pearson’s product-moment correlation was run to assess the relationship 
between the quantity and originality of ideas. There were two sets of correlation analyses. 
The first set of correlations refers to the total number of ideas, a summation of the 
number of ideas that each participant generated across 6 objects (5 min per object) and 
the sum of the originality score for those ideas. It appears there was a strong positive 
correlation between the quantity of ideas generated by a participant and the overall 
originality scores regardless of strategy conditions in the first study, r (103) = .885, p < 
.001 and as well as in the second study, r(146) = .793, p < .001. The overall originality 
score (i.e. 2 points for each idea given by less than 2% of the sample; 1 point for each 
idea with a frequency seen in 2% to 5% of the sample; 0 points for ideas given more than 
5% of the sample) is a summation of the originality score for 6 objects. The average 
participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 generated approximate 43 ideas in the 30 
minutes of the idea generation task.  The second set of correlations refers to the total 
number of ideas and the average originality of ideas for each participant.  It appears there 
was a moderate positive correlation between the quantity of ideas and the mean 
originality score (sum of originality score divided by total number of ideas) in both Study 
1 and Study 2.  In the first study, r(103) = .434, p < .001; in the second study, r(146) = 
.333, p < .001.   The scatterplots summarize the results in Figures 3-11, 3-12, 3-13 and 3-
14.  
 There seems to be no differences in quantity of ideas and originality of ideas for 
the different objects.  The descriptive statistics of mean number of ideas per object and 
mean originality per object are shown in Appendix K and L. 
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r(146) =.793, p < .001
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r(146) =.333, p < .001
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 Are those who generate a higher number of ideas more likely to generate more 
original ideas?  All participants were sorted by total number of ideas across 6 objects and 
divided into 4 quartiles (37 Ss per group). Quartile 1 has participants who generated ideas 
ranging in quantity from 13 to 28; Quartile 2: ranged from 28 to 38; Quartile 3: ranged 
from 39 to 51; Quartile 4: ranged from 51 to 105.  The mean of originality score per idea 
was calculated.  There was a significant effect of quantity on originality for the 4 groups,  
F (3, 144) = 9.003, p < .001 in Figure 3-15.  It appears that participants who were 
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Position of Ideas: Original Ideas Come Later 
Many studies have found that ideas generated later tend to be better than early 
ideas since Christensen, Guilford, & Wilson (1957) first demonstrated the effect.  The 
results of the first and the second studies have been verified to see if they aligned with the 
prior studies.  Two different methods were used to confirm that original ideas do come 
later.  The graph in Figure 3-16 shows the mean score of originality (from 0 to 2) for 
ideas that appear in the ith position, i = 1, 2,…10, regardless of conditions and objects for 
the first study and the second study.  It was reasonable to choose 10 positions, because 
about half of the sample size generated at least 10 ideas.  It appears that participants came 









Figure 3-16. Participants who generated at least 10 ideas in any of those 6 objects were more 
likely to come up with more original ideas later in Study 1(left) and Study 2 (right). 
 
Another bar graph Figure 3-17 is to show the percentage of ideas that were 
original (less than 5% of the sample generated the idea) for each position. 
 
	  













Figure 3-17. Percentage of ideas that were original is each position in Study 1 (left) and Study 2 
(right). 
 
Self Report / Manipulation Check 
 In study 2, participants were asked to indicate which ideas they had never thought 
or heard of before while doing this task.  It appears the participants were able to follow 
the prompt to indicate their ideas, however, there was a discrepancy between the 
subjective opinions of participants themselves and the objective observations from the 
frequency of occurrence of novel ideas across 6 objects.  A total number of 1597 ideas 
was reported by participants themselves as “more original” ideas; however, half of them 
could be considered less original, as shown in Figure 3-18.  
 As for the post-task questionnaire (Appendix M), the graph in Figure 3-19 shows 
that nearly everyone (83-94%) followed the mindset manipulation, and the rating is even 
higher than the first study (more than 70-75% in MW and HC).  The helpfulness of 
mindset varies from 89% to 100%.  There seemed to be a strong demand to say mindsets 
were helpful because participants were told that the strategy was proven. Again, the 
rating is higher than in the previous study (69% in HC and 60% in MW).  In terms of 
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ease of mindset: It is interesting to see that only 46-51% of the participants found the 
mindset easy to use, but again, consistent with the rating of the first study, only half of 
the participants in both the Mind-Wandering and Human-Centric groups self-reported 


















Figure 3-19 The result of post task questionnaire in study 2. 
Discussion 
In Study 1, participants in the Human-Centric mindset group provided with the 





































ideas >5% ideas 3-5% ideas 1-2%
Objective Observations
	  
  83 
the Mind-Wandering group and the Control group.  In Study 2, the same heuristics of 
roles appeared to trigger the creative mindset of participants in the Human-Centric group 
to generate more uses and more original ideas as opposed to those in the pictorial stimuli 
condition and the Mind-Wandering group.  It is not surprising that a picture is not always 
worth a thousand words.  On the one hand, pictures provide some concrete details that 
seem to help focus of perceptual attention to enhance idea generation from a broad 
conceptual association (Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003). On the other hand, 
a stereotypical image of a mundane object (as was intended to be used in this study) 
might impede the generation of new uses. In the present study, it appears that pictures 
hindered the performance of the Human-Centric mindset group and participants presented 
with the pictorial stimuli has a significantly lower number of ideas than those without 
pictorial stimuli.  This finding is consistent with the previous research related to design 
fixation (e.g. Jansson & Smith, 1991).  When common knowledge was reinforced by the 
typicality of an example, participants generated fewer and less original ideas.  
Furthermore, this study examined whether the Human-Centric and the Mind-
Wandering mindset groups differed in the temporal pattern of their idea generation and in 
the quality of their ideas. First, this study examined the response time between ideas 
across all objects in these two groups (P or W).  Although both groups showed a trend 
toward greater time taken to generate ideas later, participants in the Mind-Wandering 
group did take more time to generate ideas and those who were able to use Human-
Centric strategy were able to persist longer. The subtle zig-zag pattern for both groups 
shows an initial slow response followed by a quick response and then a slow response 
again, suggesting that ideas often cue one another.  This finding is consistent with the 
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previous research related to the interpretation of ambiguous design (Tversky & Chou, 
2011). Participants in the blocked group who saw the same ambiguous sketch for 10 trials 
in a row seemed to take some time to come up with an initial interpretation or theme, but 
subsequent interpretations were faster, and then slowed down.  The fact that the Human-
Centric group would generally spend less time generating each idea than the Mind-
Wandering group was perhaps due to their more systematic way of searching for more 
original ideas.   
The overall relationship between the heuristics of roles and the originality / 
fluency of ideas was evaluated in Study 2.  The results confirm that there is a strong 
positive correlation between the diversity of roles and originality and a strong positive 
correlation between the diversity of roles and the fluency of ideas as well.  People who 
used many different roles generated more uses and more original ideas and people who 
were more original and fluent tended to adopt many different roles to generate ideas.  
These findings regarding roles strengthen the aspect of associative processes theory 
which maintains that thinking about certain types of people can enhance or impede 
creative thinking.  The previous research shows that even minimal cues suggesting 
“creative people” or a related social group can trigger our creative mindset to perform 
better.  For example, thinking of "professor" relative to "soccer hooligan" leads to more 
correct responses to common knowledge questions (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 
1998); thinking about a "punk" or "engineer" enables participants to solve more creative 
insight problems and thinking about an "engineer" helps participants solve more 
analytical reasoning problems (Förster, Friedman, Butterbach, & Sassenberg, 2005).  It is 
interesting to note from the current findings that creative prototyped groups in the 
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provided role strategy, such as “artist,” “architect,” or “musician,” did not always 
guarantee the more original ideas.  Sometimes, a mundane object with a stereotyped role 
can also spark something new.  For example, “teaching shapes to children” with a 
flashlight, “using spindles (of a chair) as pegs for kids in a classroom’s coats,” “physician 
uses a broom to measure kid’s height.”  It seems plausible to assume that each role 
provided in the strategy served as a kind of knowledge activation to increase that role’s 
potential for further activation and also increase the accessibility of other roles.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present research is based on the obvious assumption that the same knowledge 
structure and cognitive processes involved in everyday activities can be used to explain 
how people creatively generate new uses for old things — more specifically, how they 
generate new uses through the retrieval of existing concepts and knowledge structures 
from memory and the formation of new associations among them. As Schank and Cleary 
(1995) have affirmed, the “world is not full of standard problems amenable to standard 
solutions,” and everyone “needs to be somewhat creative simply to get through a typical 
day and deal with the innumerable shifts from the ordinary that arise.” (p.229). Even a 
simple routine activity implies a certain re-creation of the knowledge structure since each 
situation can be different and is experienced differently by each person.  Each day at any 
moment, any particular word or object can be retrieved from memory and reinterpreted in 
different ways to guide or bias our actions and thoughts (Barsalou, 1983).   It is a major 
challenge finding new and original ideas in daily activities as well as innovating new 
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concepts and developing existing ones in design, science, technology, business and even 
politics. 
Mind-wandering, as an implicit estimate of the ideas under consideration, has 
been recognized as central to a serendipitous search process during the design incubation.  
However, the human-centric approaches using role heuristics are particular strategies or 
explicit reminders that might direct people to look at a person’s immediate environment 
and cultural or experiential background, and hence boost creative performance and avoid 
unnecessary interference.  The present studies directly explore these two common design 
mindsets side by side in the real world.  In two online experiments, participants were 
asked to generate as many as new uses of common household objects using either a 
mind-wandering or human-centric mindset approach.  Study 1 had a control group and 
names of objects. Study 2 presented pictures of objects to half the participants and names 
of objects to the other half.  The dependent variables were the fluency of ideas, 
originality of ideas, diversity of assignable roles and response time between ideas.  In 
both studies, the human-centric mindset had significant effects on the fluency of uses and 
the originality of ideas.  Although participants given no particular search strategy 
frequently reported that they tended to have things come to their minds, their 
performance didn’t differ from the mind-wandering mindset group and was outperformed 
by those using the human-centric mindset strategy.  Pictorial stimuli didn’t give an 
advantage to generating more uses and more original ideas in either mindset groups. 
Presenting the names of objects and providing roles in the search strategy seemed enough 
to help induce a diversity of roles and hence more uses and more original ideas.  
Participants with the mind-wandering mindset did take longer to generate ideas than 
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those using a human-centric mindset, who were able to persist longer in generating ideas 
as well.  The general finding in the dissertation is consistent with previous research 
showing that those who generated more ideas were more likely to generate more original 
ideas and those who persisted in ideation more frequently produced more original uses. 
Implications 
Design is a “joyous activity” that “the quest for fitness of form, purpose, and 
beauty allied in one meaningful whole,” in the words of Victor Papanek (1983), an early 
advocate of design for human scale. For Papanek, design was “the innate pattern-making 
impulse of human beings” that “combines creative, intellectual ventures with intuitive, 
playful elements.” Design means activities that affirm life.  When people actively 
imagine many different tasks and different roles in various situations, they increase the 
possibilities of getting better solutions for themselves and others.  
Prior studies in generating novel uses often directed people to focus on objects, 
situations or events, or switch between a different time or space. The present studies 
extend different perspectives to people themselves and demonstrate that to think of 
different roles people can take in a society enhances their search skills in finding new and 
innovative ideas.  It reflects a trend in design conversations to rediscover a reciprocal 
flow not only between professional designers and different users but between ordinary 
people with different roles across various fields.  Certainly focusing on the physical 
properties of objects is one way to get new ideas and solve problems, there are plenty of 
examples of good design and bad design as well.   With so much digital technology 
power within personal grasp, one can easily initiate a creative “product,” either tangible 
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or intangible, owning to direct access to tools that once belonged only to professional 
designers.  It appears that anyone with the design concept and relatively simple skill set 
can intervene in another’s creation and make alterations.   
From another point of view, the traditional qualitative attributes to evaluate idea 
responses in generating design concepts need to be reconsidered, particularly the concept 
of “usefulness” or so-called “product worthiness,” which might be debatable in different 
fields.  When the idea of an “electric voice transmission device” later gave birth to the 
“telephone” more than a century ago, “people could not “imagine why they would want 
or need to talk—immediately—to someone who was across town or, even more absurdly, 
in another town” (Schlossberg, 1998).  In attempting to demonstrate the “usefulness” of 
the device in communicating between two places, Alexander Graham Bell reportedly 
struggled to invite people to come to Town Hall in New York to listen to the Philadelphia 
Orchestra through the receiver.   “Appropriateness” is another controversial attribute used 
to evaluate ideas.  Many concepts of design can come from our wildest imaginations.  
Some irrelevant combinations of ideas, like “drinkable book” or “teaching pan” have 
become realized through considerations of different roles.  They are not just for the sake 
of difference or novelty to the individual.  For example, the idea of using a book to 
instruct people how to clean drinking water while using its pages to double as actual 
water filters to produce drinking water has been demonstrated to “kill over 99% of 
harmful bacteria during trials in Bangladesh, Ghana and South Africa,” featured in the 
latest issue of Time magazine (Nov. 30 / Dec. 7, 2015) on its popular list “The 25 Best 
Inventions of 2015.” 
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There is potential for the cultivation of good design, particularly in developing the 
design heuristics inherent in many different cultures.     
Limitations 
 Besides the general concerns addressed in the previous section of methodological 
considerations, another major limitation is having to choose a common ground to run 
experiments across the domains of psychological research and design between the 
laboratory and the real world.  Amazon Web service offers an appealing solution because 
it allows large samples of participants within a relatively short time frame, but at the 
same time it restricts the possibilities of design manipulation. For example, on the one 
hand, the total testing time needs to be limited within an hour before participants become 
totally distracted or lose track of time; on the other hand, the time factor is a common 
constraint on generating particular ideas during improvisation in daily life.  Another 
limitation is the well-known dilemma concerning the design of self-reports of inner states 
in order to check the mindset manipulation.  Despite the fact that we can expect most 
introspective reporting to involve more than we can know, there may be a better way to 
verify discrepancies between those observables and the real design behavior. 
Future Research 
  The present studies haven’t answered all questions concerning design fixation.  
One area of future research is to present different set of pictures for objects that are with 
uncommon instead of typical features, as prior studies such as the “idea exposure 
paradigm” (Perttula & Sipilä, 2007) showed that seeing unusual examples might 
encourage additional new ideas.  Another possible concern about the pictorial stimuli is 
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that the orientation of the images hasn’t been systemized for interaction with them.  
Whether the orientation of the images would interact with people when they were told to 
think of different roles remains to be seen.  For example, would the broom handle 
oriented toward the viewer make the viewer think about the broom as a first-person user 
more often than thinking about its uses by another (third-person) user?  The orientation of 
the images might add another layer of information that either helps change the 
perspective or impedes that change.  
Additional research will also be needed to understand the underlying knowledge 
mechanism of provided and invented roles that triggers the creative mindset.  One 
concern often mentioned in those previous incubation studies is that associative processes 
do not seem to perform well under conscious guidance and that unconscious thought 
would be needed to boost up the associative search for new ideas. The current study did 
find the correlation between the diversity of roles and the quantity/originality of ideas, 
that is, mentally combing the provided role and the invented role helped make discoveries 
effectively.  However, some roles in the creative prototypical group (e.g. artist, musician) 
in the list of provided roles do not necessarily provide motivation to generate more 
original concepts if participants only use the sematic constructs, procedures or actions 
found in stereotypes they are familiar with.  For example, “artist--drawing” often 
becomes an automatic association which would not go too far.  Those who are able to 
think divergently seem to go beyond the basic functions of a painter or a sculptor as 
occupational roles and recognize the social role of an artist who is associated with a more 
unconventional attitude and lifestyle.  Writer is another example of versatile role that 
keeps changing across the timeline.  Only those who are capable of capturing the 
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dynamic nature of the role (e.g. from the historic character, storyteller to everyday 
reporter) can create more ad hoc connections and invent a greater number of different 
roles.  
To add another layer of complexity, future research may need to clarify whether 
some roles seldom associated with creative groups, such as “police” and “politician,” also 
enhance the originality of ideas.  The negative imagination of violence or corruption 
could become the source of invention.  It might be the case that those kind of roles trigger 
people’s creative mindsets to think of invented “heroes” or even “villains” to create tools 
to protest or fight for themselves. Alternatively, they may be led to conform to 
stereotypes and become trapped inside the negative actions.  
 
Conclusion 
Everyone can improvise, many pursue a spark of intuition, but others may search 
for something new out of exhausted means through a perspective shift.  One way to avoid 
fixation is to generate many ideas by thinking about different roles.  Design is about 
changing perspectives. Perhaps design is more about an attitude one assumes in a 
permanent search for substitutes of a perfect idea in our daily life. Making good use of 
heuristics can help prototype infinite possibilities faster than rely on pure chance.  
This dissertation research attempts to go beyond anecdotal beliefs and provides evidence 
for the effectiveness of design heuristics of roles.  It demonstrates that mind-wandering 
per se isn’t necessarily good, but it’s how our minds wander.  The results from the two 
experiments support the conclusion that using a human-centric mindset helps generate 
more uses and more original ideas.  Among those given the search heuristics of roles, 
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those who are able to explore more different roles generate alternative uses and more 
original ideas. Future studies should examine the remaining concern of pictorial stimuli 
and further explore the underlying mechanism of roles that affect people deeply.  It 
would be enriching to extend such human-centric mindset to a powerful perspective 
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General Instructions 
Welcome Screen
Mindset Conditions: Specific Heuristics 
mind-wandering human-centric control
[Introduction: Everyday Ingenuity Study]
[Same instructions across 3 conditions]
Procedure for Study I
Post Task Questionnaire 
Demographic Survey  
[How often? How useful? Any other strategies?]
[age / language / background / work experience]
Novel Uses Task: 5 Objects in Random Orders 
(broom / flashlight / chair / umbrella / shoe)
obj1 obj2 obj3 obj4 obj5 smart 
phone+hanger +
Practice (3 min) Real Task (5 min per object)
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2 x 2 Factorial Design
Factor 1: Mindsets triggered by Heuristics; Factor 2: Stimuli 










[Same instructions across 4 conditions]
Procedure for Study II
Post Task Questionnaire 
Demographic Survey  
[How often? How useful? Any other strategies?]
[age / language / background / work experience]
Novel Uses Task: 5 Objects in Random Orders 
(broom / flashlight / chair / umbrella / shoe)
obj1 obj2 obj3 obj4 obj5 smart 
phone+hanger +
Practice (3 min) Real Task (5 min per object)
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echanic - To prop open the hood 







Architect - To lay out the w
alk-
























Physicians - Use as a height 
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Paint it green/ stick nude m
odel on 








































































































































































































  119 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  121 
























  122 




























  123 
Appendix M: Post Task Questionnaire 
 
 
